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Thesis Abstract
This study explores the link between vulnerability and participation in international
negotiations on climate change. Climate change has developed into an urgent, growing problem,
as it has caused significant destruction to earth’s biodiversity and societies across the world.
However, the international community has yet to formulate a global plan to successfully combat
climate change. Therefore, it is imperative to take into account the necessary conditions for
countries to be more open to negotiating, as only then can the global community reach a
successful, united plan. Moreover, it is vital to establish a global plan in order to secure the
health of the planet for future generations and to safeguard the international community which
faces a variety of challenges that stem from climate change. The question this thesis seeks to
answer is whether developing countries are likely to participate more actively in international
and regional negotiations once they actually begin to feel the impacts of climate change. Using a
combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, I detail three cases: Kenya, Qatar and
Trinidad and Tobago. The case studies suggest that experiencing considerable vulnerability to
climate change has indeed motivated developing countries to become more involved in
international and regional negotiations. However, the perception of vulnerability by itself does
not mean that a country will be proactive. The securement of financial aid, the desire to attain
global or regional prestige and leadership, and international pressure are all factors which are
likely to serve as motivation for involvement as well. Kenya’s high involvement is due to its
high vulnerability to climate change along with its desire to secure financial aid and achieve
regional and global prestige. Similarly, high vulnerability, financial aid and the desire to achieve
prestige and regional leadership contributes to Trinidad and Tobago’s high level of involvement.
Qatar’s moderate involvement is likely due to the fact that it is ranked much lower in
vulnerability to climate change and it has only recently begun to feel the impacts of climate
change. Prestige, regional leadership, international pressure and the spread of environmental
norms have also motivated Qatar to become more involved.
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CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION
This study will explore the link between vulnerability and participation in international
negotiations on climate change. Focusing on the most recent international climate change
negotiations, I will look to see what possible circumstances could motivate developing countries
to play a larger role in negotiations. This thesis will review negotiations starting from 2009 to
2013: the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the 2011 Durban outcomes,
the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway and a set of decisions agreed at the 2013 conference in Warsaw.
Though these negotiations have been underway for some time, an agreement on measures to
mitigate the climate change problem has yet to be made.
Global climate change presents one of the most significant threats facing the world today.
Major environmental degradation spurred by climate change has occurred in regions and
societies across the globe. Scientists have discovered that climate change is the central cause of
the destruction of the Earth’s biodiversity. The increasing natural and man-made destruction of
the Earth’s environment has produced harmful effects that threaten populations and habitats
globally.1
As concern surrounding Earth’s warming climate grew, the first major international
meeting, the World Climate Conference, was set up in 1979 to address the rising concern of
climate change. Later on, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was created in 1992. This global treaty was created in an effort for countries to
cooperatively consider what they could do to limit average global temperature increases and the
resulting climate change. The treaty also served as a means for countries to manage how they
would deal with climatic impacts that were foreseeable in the future.2

“Climate Change Will Cause Widespread Global-Scale Loss of Common Plants and Animals, Researchers
Predict.” Science Daily, (2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130512140946.htm.
2
. “Essential Background,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed February 4, 2014,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php.
1

4

Soon after, the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol in an effort to control greenhouse
gas emissions. The Protocol entered into force in 2005 and served as an international agreement
which commits its Parties by setting internationally binding emission reduction targets.3 The
Kyoto Protocol was established after a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) concluded that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are very likely
responsible for most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid20th century.4 Hence, the Protocol's main feature is to instill mandatory targets for greenhouse
gas emissions for the world’s leading economies which have accepted it.5 So far, the worlds
leading economies have refused to participate in the agreements, yet are among the world’s
highest greenhouse gas emitters. Moreover, developing countries were not obliged to lower
greenhouse gas emissions under the agreement so as to not deter their economic development
and progress. Since the agreement left out the major players that are in fact contributing to global
climate change, cooperation within the international community to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions could, at most, achieve only limited success. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol fell short
of acting as an effective framework for addressing global warming.6
Since 2009, international negotiations have been conducted in an attempt to take up
where the Kyoto Protocol left off and move forward with discussing new climate change
mitigation efforts. In November 2011, the International Energy Agency warned that the world
may be fast approaching a tipping point concerning climate change, and suggested that the next
five years will be crucial for greenhouse gas reduction efforts.7 Humans produce greenhouse

“Kyoto Protocol” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed on February 4, 2014,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
4
“Understanding and Attributing Climate Change - AR4 WGI Summary for Policymakers” Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, accessed on February 5, 2014,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-understanding-and.html.
5
“Kyoto Protocol” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
6
Hiroji Hizosaki, “Japan: Achieving its Kyoto Target” Crucial Issues in Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol:
Asia and the World.” World Scientific Publishing Co., (2010), p. 383.
7
“The Global Climate Change Regime, Scope of the Challenge” Council on Foreign Relations, (June 9, 2013).
3
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gases by burning coal, oil, and natural gas to generate energy for power, heat, industry, and
transportation. Deforestation and agricultural activity also yield climate-changing emissions.
Avoiding the worst consequences of climate change will require large cuts in global greenhouse
gas emissions.8
As high per-capita GDP correlates strongly with high per-capita emissions,
and no large country has ever experienced lasting economic growth without simultaneously
increasing emissions, it is perhaps not surprising that more than thirty years have passed since
the first World Climate Conference and fifteen years have passed since the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force. Still, no global plan
to reduce emissions has been successfully formulated by the international community. As
international negotiations continue, it is apparent that measures to reduce global greenhouse gas
emissions will require full international participation and substantial financial cost.
This topic was selected for three reasons: First, the environment is a crucial matter
to research, as scientific evidence has revealed that without significant action taken now, the
warming climate will continue to unleash harsh threats upon the planet and societies now and in
the future. Second, as climate change presents a problem that affects the entire world, it is crucial
to investigate the several components that have caused the past failure of collective action among
countries in order to find new and improved mechanisms that will promote international
collaboration. Third, the international community continues to face several other significant
problems which are connected to climate change, and without successful negotiation of climate
change mitigation, these problems are very likely to persist.
I have chosen to focus in particular on smaller developing countries because while much
attention has been focused on the responsibilities and concerns of developed countries as well as
the advanced developing countries, not so much is known about the rest of the world. All nations
8

Ibid.

6

are suffering from the effect of climate change. My question is: do these smaller countries also
feel the urgency of participating fully in climate change negotiations and if so, why?
The subsequent chapters will address the research design and theoretical literature
followed by a review of recent international negotiations on climate change, case analysis, and
an assessment and conclusion which will communicate my findings.
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CHAPTER 2-RESEARCH DESIGN &LITERATURE

Research Design
As opposed to the attention paid to developed and advanced developing countries, little
attention has been paid to less advanced developing countries on the issue of climate change and
the ongoing international negotiations. There has been a divide in climate change negotiations
between developed and advanced developing countries, and the less advanced developing
countries have not gained as much attention as their larger counterparts.1 However, the
environmental health of the world depends on all nations. Traditionally, developing countries
have been concerned with development rather than the environment, and so it has taken some
time for them to come to prioritizing environmental issues. These countries are an important part
of the process; most importantly, the majority of these countries have been directly affected by
the harmful effects of climate change even though most of them pollute the least. Thus, some of
these countries are highly vulnerable and are at great risk of harmful environmental occurrences
as the climate continues to change.2 Moreover, high vulnerability to climate change has
prevented these countries from developing to their fullest potential, thus it is in their self-interest
to be proactive on environmental matters. For these reasons, it is important to consider the
conditions that may enhance their involvement in international negotiations.
“Climate change vulnerability” is a term that will be used to characterize the focus of this
study, as all countries are in danger. The definition of climate change vulnerability, taken from

1

Bradley C Parks and J Timmons Roberts. “Inequality and the Global Climate Regime: Breaking the North-South
Impasse.” Centre of International Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, no. 4 (2008): 621–
22.
2
“Press Conference by Alliance of Small Island States on Climate Change | Meetings Coverage and Press
Releases.” United Nations, (2009), http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/090710_AOSIS.doc.htm.
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Second Assessment Report, is, “The extent to
which climate change may damage or harm a particular system as well as its ability to adapt to
new climatic conditions.”3
My hypothesis is that only when developing countries actually begin to feel the impacts
of climate change are they likely to participate actively in international and regional negotiations.
Some of these countries are strategizing as regions, some individually, and almost all have
entered into global discussions but some are more active then others. I will attempt to support my
hypothesis by examining three types of countries: (1) countries dependent on agricultural
exports, because these countries rely largely on arable land and agricultural output for economic
stability, but agriculture has been significantly threatened by climate change; (2) hydrocarbon
economies, because these countries rely heavily on the utilization of fossil fuels for the
production of energy, yet these processes, which emit large amounts of carbon dioxide, are
harmful to the environment and have exacerbated climate change; and (3) Small Island
Developing States (SIDS), because these countries face inherent challenges to climate change,
mainly the danger of significant sea-level rise.
I will select one country from each group to determine what their positions have been on
the climate change issue across time as reflected in their involvement in the global talks. The
countries selected are Kenya, a country dependent on agricultural exports; Qatar, a hydrocarbon
economy; and Trinidad and Tobago, a small island developing state. These countries are at
varying levels of development and face a broad range of different problems stemming from
climate change.4 I have declined to choose the really large developing countries, such as China,
“IPCC Second Assessment-Climate Change 1995” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), p. 28,
http://ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf.
4
“Executive Summary,” Center for International Earth Science Information Network, accessed on February 4,
2014, http://www.ciesin.org/docs/003-079/execsummary.html.
3
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India and Brazil because a lot of attention is focused on them and not enough on less advanced
developing countries.
I am proposing that their participation in international climate change negotiations is
related to the perception of climate change vulnerability, the independent variable included in
this study. In general, developing countries like the ones I have selected are beginning to feel the
impacts of climate change, and as a result, it is vital for them to be included in international
negotiations. Less developed countries like Kenya do not have the economic or financial power
to mitigate harsh climatic effects and are lower in economic status compared to the rest of the
world. Furthermore, these countries have not yet developed a scientific establishment on the
issue of climate change, as compared to richer regions like North America, which can look past
the material aspects of development. In some ways, the environment has been seen as a luxury to
the developing world, which is still focused heavily on development and is not as focused as
developed countries in regards to establishing solid scientific research on the environment.5
Nonetheless, the participation of all developing countries in negotiations is crucial to combating
climate change, not only domestically but as a worldwide phenomenon. Thus, my hypothesis
rests on one assumption: I assume that developing countries in which people are able to observe
the physical destruction of their environment and face the challenges of adapting to new climatic
conditions are likely to become proactive in negotiations.
To measure my independent variable, I will use the climate change vulnerability
index (CCVI) developed by the global risk advisory firm Maplecroft to measure vulnerability for
each country. For my dependent variable, I will review the performance of each country in recent

“Agenda 21 – Science For Sustainable Development” United Nations Environment Programme, accessed on
February 2, 2014, http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?DocumentID=52&ArticleID=85&l=en.
5
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international climate change negotiations from 2009 to 2013. This will include negotiations on
the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the 2011 Durban outcomes, the
2012 Doha Climate Gateway and a set of decisions agreed at the 2013 conference in Warsaw.
Also included are any other notable regional negotiations but not the 64th Session of the UN
General Assembly which was devoted to climate change and which was attended by all
countries, with almost all sending high-level delegates. I will determine involvement by
observing the following five categories: (1) how many negotiating sessions did they attend?;
(2) how many delegates did they send to the five main sessions? (I omit the regional sessions
where delegate attendance tends to be high); (3) what was the proportion of high level delegates?
(high-level delegates include presidents, prime ministers, ambassadors, members of parliament,
permanent secretaries and directors of key agencies); (4) the number of times, if any, the country
spoke at these sessions; (5) the number of times, if any, the country presented a unique proposal;
and (6) whether the country led, advocated or sponsored proposals on behalf of other
developing countries. (If so, the country will receive one extra point for each time it did so.)
As I observe the second category, I will take into account two underlying issues: the
large disparity in population size among my case studies and the fact that Qatar, one of the three
countries selected, hosted the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, one of the five negotiations
discussed. To deal with the first issue, a scale will be created. For each case, I will pick three
other countries which are similar in terms of wealth and population. For these three other
countries, I will average the number of delegates that attended the 2009-2013 climate change
negotiations. I will then compare the average number of delegates to Kenya’s, Qatar’s, and
Trinidad and Tobago’s delegation count and rank their representation as above the average of the
three similar countries, average, or below average. If the delegate count was 25 or more above
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the average, I will give the country 10 points; if it was 10-25 above, 8 points; less than 10 above
or below average, 5 points; and more than that below average only 2 points. With respect to the
level of representation, I will divide the number of high-level delegates by the full delegation to
get a percentage. If a country has a percentage of high-level representation between 35-50, I will
give it 20 points; if a country has a percentage of high-level representation between 20-34, I will
give it 10 points; and if a country has a percentage of high-level representation of 19 and below,
I will give it 5 points. Some adjustments will be made if countries score on the cusp.
Additionally, since Qatar hosted the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, their delegation was
inflated at this meeting and thus does not match what would illustrate their normal representation
at conferences. To deal with this issue, I will cancel out their actual delegate count at the 2012
Doha Climate Gateway and implement a “dummy” variable, which will be developed by
assessing their average delegation count taken at the other four negotiations. In this way, Qatar
will be given a number for the Doha conference similar to their delegate count at the other
conferences and there will be no disparity in my analysis.
To measure the total country score on participation, a scale will then be devised ranging
from 0 to 50. The ceiling of 50 seemed to be appropriate because earlier research suggested that
most countries would score well below that. Depending on how many total points each country
receives, according to the above categories, scores between 0-10 will receive a D grade, scores
between 11-20 will receive a C grade, scores between 21-30 will receive a B grade, scores
between 31-40 will receive an A grade, and scores between 41-50 will receive an A plus. The
scale can be interpreted as follows: A D grade indicates zero or low participation; a C grade
indicates moderately low participation; a B grade indicates moderately high participation; an A
grade indicates very high participation; and an A plus indicates exceptional participation. After
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analyzing the score, which will give me a sense of the countries’ commitment, I will then enter
into a more nuanced qualitative discussion in which I will investigate reasons for performance. I
will try to identify whether vulnerability relates to performance, or if there are any other
conditions that could motivate developing countries to actively join climate change negotiations.
Literature Review
Climate Change as a Complex Issue
The issue of uncertainty surrounding climate change is a major theme discussed
by scholars, who have found that the warming of the earth’s climate is a “creeping”
environmental problem which includes long-term hazards and slow-onset, cumulative processes
that ultimately can result in crises or disasters. Since there are enormous time lags in the
changing climate, there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding climate change as it is hard to measure
and predict. As a result, these challenges make climate change a complex and difficult issue for
the international community to manage and collectively act on.6 With that said, a plethora of
literature discusses how the large divide between the developed and the developing world has
caused climate change to be a problematic environmental issue for the international community
to tackle. The developed world holds the most global political influence and generally has more
options when dealing with the effects of climate change. Advanced developing countries are also
influential in their own way, but they differ from developed nations in pressing for more gradual
concessions. Meanwhile, some small developing nations, which have less say on the issue, face
severe impacts of climate change such as deforestation, water poverty, erratic weather patterns,
air pollution and vegetation loss.7
Susanne C. Moser and Lisa Dilling. “Making Climate Hot: Communicating the Urgency and Challenge of Global
Climate Change.” Environment, 46, no. 10, Heldref Publications, (2004) p. 34.
7
Ibid, p. 35.
6
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Negotiations on emission reduction among countries are increasingly fraught with
difficulty, partly because of arguments about the responsibility for the ongoing temperature rise.8
The global divide makes it difficult for the international community to negotiate an agreement on
climate change mitigation yet reinforces the need for developing countries to participate in
negotiations. Scholars discuss the importance of including developing nations in international
talks, contending that any attempt to control global C02 emissions must ultimately include them,
as well as all nations.9

Two-level Games: The Domestic and International Level
Robert Putnam’s two-level game analysis can be used to understand international
negotiations on climate change and the ways in which the domestic level is significant to
international negotiations. According to Putnam, the two-level game operates between the
domestic level and international level. At the domestic level, domestic groups put pressure on
governments to adopt favored policies. Domestic coalitions hold great bargaining power and
therefore will influence the acceptability of an agreement. 10 When applying this to climate
change negotiations, it means that it is vital that the international community considers
conditions that will be favorable to the national level so domestic needs of countries are met.
Achieving domestic approval is a top priority, as an international agreement cannot move
forward if this is not met.
Developing countries are beginning to suffer greatly from climate change. Among these

Ting Wei et al. “Developed and Developing World Responsibilities for Historical Climate Change and CO2
Mitigation.” National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, Vol. 109, no. 32 (2012): p. 12911.
9
Chen Gang. “The Kyoto Protocol and the Logic of Collective Action,” Chinese Journal of International Politics,
Vol. 1, (2007) p. 528.
10
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” International
Organization. MIT Press Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 434.
8
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countries, the physical environments are visibly damaged by climatic impacts, thus, various
domestic sectors are affected such as a country’s rural, agricultural and tourism sectors.
Furthermore, as some of these countries do not have the financial means to protect themselves
against harsh environmental effects, this further exacerbates the physical and social toll climate
change can produce. Putnam’s analysis highlights the significance of fulfilling the needs of
domestic parties. His analysis further illustrates that the decision to be proactive in climate
change negotiations rests with actors at the domestic level.

Liberalism, Constructivism and the International Environmental Regime: Fostering
Cooperation
Liberalists tend to see international relations as facilitating cooperation. They believe that
states can overcome conflict through the pacifying influence of economic interdependence,
international institutions and the spread of liberal democratic political systems.11 In fact,
liberalists argue that international organizations, institutions and regimes have a measurable
impact on global relations and the behavior of states. Regimes, like the environmental regime,
are instances of international cooperation. A regime is defined as “Government arrangements
constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international
behavior in various issue areas. Regimes thus comprise a normative element, state practice, and
organizational roles.”12
The environmental regime includes several organizations and international institutions
which have a large influence on state behavior and foreign policies with respect to climate

11

Benjamin Habib. Climate Change and the International Relations Theory: Northeast Asia as a Case Study. Third
Global International Studies Conference, Porto, Portugal: University of Porto, Portugal, (2011), p. 14. Accessed on
February 20, 2014. http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011-562.pdf.
12
Frederick Kratochwill and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A state of the Art on an Art of the
State,” International Organization 40 (1986): 753, 759.
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change mitigation. For instance, The United Nations is a major international organization that
has been instrumental in developing international legal frameworks for biodiversity conservation
and climate change. One of the most influential bodies that have been formed to address climate
change is the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was established in
1988 by the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological
Organization.13 It functioned as a scientific intergovernmental body to provide decision makers
with an assessment of the latest scientific research and its policy implications for mitigation and
adaptation. The IPCC worked diligently to review the outpouring of findings made by scientists
from all around the world and to assess human impact on the environment.14 For instance, the
IPCC has published five assessments on global warming since 1990.15 As of 2014, the IPCC has
three Working Groups and a Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.16 These
Working Groups were developed to report on available scientific information on climate change
as well as the environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change over both the short
and long term. For each report, the Working Groups have provided new knowledge and
improved understanding of the climate processes. In addition, they have developed response
strategies and have worked to broaden the scope of their assessment to include information on
the technical and economic feasibility of a range of potential adaptation and mitigation
strategies.17 Overall, The IPCC represents a unique partnership between the scientific community
and the world’s governments. 18

13

“Understanding Climate Change: 22 years of IPCC Assessment” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (November, 2010), p. 4.
14
Linda Fasulo. An Insider’s Guide to the UN. 2nd Ed. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press; 2nd
edition, (2009) p. 133.
15
IPCC “Understanding Climate Change: 22 years of IPCC Assessment,” p. 5.
16
Ibid, p. 1.
17
Ibid, pp. 4-6.
18
Ibid, p. 2.
16

Another major institution devoted to environmental issues is the UN General Assembly,
which has sponsored major international environmental conferences and has played a vital role
in advocating attention to climate change.19 Furthermore, The United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP), is another intergovernmental organization which has served as an
“institutional hub” for the UN’s many environmental initiatives.20 UNEP is not designed to
actually develop policy, but rather, to direct negotiation and implementation on environmental
issues by providing expertise and knowledge.21 Finally, two international financial institutions,
the World Bank and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), have helped finance various
climate change initiatives. While the World Bank has supported sustainable projects,22 the GEF
has emerged as a largely independent and primary source of funding for multilateral
environmental agreements, which include funding the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its various accords and protocols.23 As liberalists note, the
environmental regime centers on policies and agreements linked to climate change mitigation.
Several international institutions have contributed significantly to scientific research, holding
international conferences and promoting and enforcing international cooperation on climate
change mitigation.
Though cooperation can be advanced through international institutions, it is important to
note that there are existing barriers to cooperation including the complexity and novelty of the
problem itself, which have hindered the adoption of an adequate solution. Nations throughout the
world experience a range of various environmental risks, as some experience the worst effects
Marvin Soroos, “Global Institutions and the Environment.” Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy.
(2011) Washington DC: CQ Press. pp. 31-32.
20
Ibid, p. 33.
21
Andresen, Steinar and Kristin Rosendal. 2009. “The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme in the
Coordination of Multilateral Environmental Agreements.” In International Organizations in Global Environmental
Governance, London: Routledge, p. 135.
22
Marvin Soroos, “Global Institutions and the Environment,” p. 59.
23
Ibid, p. 43.
19
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while others may actually benefit from a warmer climate. Nonetheless, despite these differences
and challenges, all nations should share the common interest in avoiding catastrophic effects
from climate change; therefore there is an overall aim for the global community to achieve
cooperation.24
Neoliberal institutionalism further explains the challenges and benefits of cooperation, as
it focuses mainly on how cooperation is achieved in the world. Robert Keohane, a firm advocate
of neoliberal institutionalism, has noted under this theory that cooperation is hard to achieve, but,
regimes, like the environmental regime and its institutions, could benefit states by incorporating
cooperative strategies. Keohane defines cooperation as a process whereby states, “adjust their
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy
coordination” 25 Furthermore, according to political scientist John Ruggie, regimes are “a set of
mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial
commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.”26 As illustrated through the
environmental regime, neoliberal institutionalism argues that states pursue such policies because
it is usually in the best interest of all involved to do so.
The constructivist framework emphasizes the value of beliefs and ideology, and has
stressed the role of non-state actors more than other IR approaches. For example, scholars have
made note of the role of transnational actors such as NGOs or transnational corporations in
changing state beliefs about foreign policy. Such “norm entrepreneurs” are able to influence state
behavior through rhetoric or other forms of lobbying, persuasion, and shaming.27 The social
Jeremiah Collins. “Assessing International Cooperation on Climate Change: A Neoliberal Analysis of the
Effectiveness of Formal International Environmental Institutions,” Mapping Politics, 4 (2012) p. 3-4.
25
Robert O. Keohane. “Chapter 4 Cooperation and International Regimes.” In After Hegemony Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy, 51.Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
26
Ibid, 57.
27
ME Keck and K Sikkink “Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics” (Cornell
University Press, Ithaca (1998).
24
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construction of the actors’ identities and interests, and of structures such as discourses and norms
is at the core of constructivism.28 This is reflected in the interests and identities of climate change
actors such as the individuals, sub-state actors, states and international organizations which have
emerged in climate change negotiations.29
Social scientists have progressively adopted constructivism to understand environmental
issues. Constructivists hold that social facts are real because they have material consequences
and material consequences are real by virtue of social construction.30 Constructivists maintain
that the material and ideational are complexly intertwined and interdependent.31 Thus, any study
of climate change must give value to both. This approach contributes to the understanding of
how material realities gain meaning through social interaction. Accordingly, interpretations of
climate change are shaped by social and material forces.32
The social construction of climate change in political science, specifically how politics
have been incorporated into the science of climate change, is illustrated in recent literature.
Through reviewing the history of climate modeling and several scientific controversies, author
David Demeritt reveals the implicit social and epistemic commitments implied by its particular
practices. The scientific framing of global climate change has reinforced, and has been
reinforced, by how technical experts, governments and scientists have managed the issue. For

Mary E. Pettenger. “Chapter 1 Introduction: Power, Knowledge and the Social Construction of Climate Change.”
In The Social Construction of Climate Change, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., (2007) p. 6.
29
Ibid, p. 7.
30
Pettenger, p. 6.
31
Colin Hay, “The WSCR Archive: What Place for Ideas in the Structure-Agency Debate? Globalisation as a
“Process Without a Subject.” The Website for Critical Realism. First Press: Writing in the Critical Social Sciences
(2001). Accessed on March 18, 2014. http://www.criticalrealism.com/archive/cshay_wpisad.html.
32
Pettenger, p. 6.
28
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example, we can look at how the scientific construction of climate change was developed
through the scientific discovery of the harsh effects greenhouse gases have on the atmosphere.33
Through a constructivist lens, the social definitions of climate change can be examined and seen
as a threat or an opportunity.34 In this respect, the social knowledge of climate change and the
existing distrust of the science that surrounds it raises important questions about trust,
uncertainty, and expertise.35
Why States Resist or Cooperate
I.

Realism
In contrast to liberalists, realists would assert that states interests are defined in terms of

power and each state wishes to dominate in the anarchical international system. Under realism,
all nations are distrustful and would not normally cooperate because this would be against their
top priority of self-interest and goal of power preservation and maximization.36 Furthermore,
under realism, states must constantly ensure that they have sufficient power to defend themselves
and advance their material interests necessary for survival.37 With that said, the past failure of
states to collectively act to find a solution to the climate change problem can be illustrated under
this theory. Global efforts to reduce the adverse effects of climate change requires countries to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels and adopt alternative environmentally-friendly
technologies. However, the international community has not developed a unified solution
regarding global mitigation efforts because reducing capabilities required for climate change
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mitigation threatens the economic development of a country, and in turn, disrupts the goal of
power maximization. For example, energy and food security are all vital to a country’s survival
and makes them feel powerful, thus they will likely want to develop capabilities, such as
agricultural and industrial practices, in order to preserve and enhance their economic
development. As a result, cooperation is not likely to happen. Furthermore, given the existing
distrust of science surrounding the evolution of climate change, there is the notion that states
may perceive that implementing efforts to mitigate climate change is a plot to get them to stop
developing. In this case, international collaboration is unlikely to occur and the climate change
problem will not be resolved.
II.

Compliance
The international climate change regime has existing and emerging compliance systems.

The literature discusses how international climate change compliance mechanisms are
undergoing a period of considerable change and uncertainty as the shape and direction of
international climate change obligations are being transformed. This transformation includes a
shift towards increased parallelism between developing and developed countries in terms of
targets and a more limited range for a Kyoto Protocol-style compliance mechanism. In other
words, rather than holding only industrialized countries responsible for meeting targets on
emission emitting, a larger range of countries will bear the responsibility to meet emission
reduction targets.38
Many small countries are being pressured by the developed nations to adhere to
environmental standards. Scholar Jeanne Hey acknowledges the many ways in which
dependency influences foreign policy. According to Hey, states that are economically dependent
on powerful nations, otherwise known as the core, will either align their foreign policies with
Hugh S. Wilkins “Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Change Regime.” Review of European
Community & International and Environmental Law Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Vol. 21, no. 3 (2012) p. 303-305.
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those of the core or go against them. Hey discusses four categories of behavior between the core
and the periphery states that can further explain this idea: compliance, consensus, counterdependence and compensation. When the periphery, or the weaker state, shapes its foreign
policies against the requests of the core state, the periphery can face a lot of military or economic
sanctions from the core state as a result. Thus, it is likely that the periphery will seek to align
themselves with the core state to avoid punishment.39
Hey cites Bruce Moon to explain that through compliance and consensus, the foreign
policy outcomes of dependent states will be aligned with the preferences of the core. Under
compliance, the dependent state will consider the core’s wishes regarding foreign policy
decisions in order to be rewarded or not to be punished.40 Furthermore, the core’s economic
authority can be used to achieve a particular foreign policy behavior from the dependent nation.
Executing this strategy depends on the level of autonomy of the periphery state. Analysts have
looked at two political perspectives in assessing the relationship between domestic and foreign
policy. The first includes the application of an elite attitudinal approach to assess values and
ideologies of decision makers, while the second looks at the domestic, state, class, and social and
external forces to help explain the level of autonomy in determining a state’s potential of
counter-dependency policy-making.41
Hey’s work can be applied to the conduct of dependent states in the context of
climate change. As illustrated in past climate change negotiations, the powerful influence that
developed countries have exerted on small developing countries has influenced their behavior in
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some instances. Dependent countries have agreed to international climate change agreements in
order to be rewarded with financial support and to avoid punishment, and they also at times have
been pressured to join these agreements by more powerful countries.
There are benefits as well: research suggests that through international assistance, the
economic and social conditions in developing countries can be strengthened, which in turn can
influence and improve domestic policymaking on climate change mitigation.42 In particular,
countries can largely benefit from programs that are developed to encourage and train
communities in engaging in sustainability practices. These programs can also educate citizens
and enforce capacity building to improve policies in climate change mitigation and to reduce
economic vulnerability.
In the next chapter, I will provide some background on the five major conferences on
climate change which are the focus on this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3-BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, 2009-2013

The 2009 Copenhagen Accord
In an effort to strengthen the global response to climate change, a United Nations
conference known as the Copenhagen Summit was held in Copenhagen, Denmark in December,
2009. The Kyoto Protocol—an international agreement which went into force in 2005 which
commits its Parties by setting internationally binding emission reduction targets1—failed in
many respects to properly combat and mitigate climate change on a global scale.2 As a result, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—an international treaty
established in 1992 to limit average global temperature increases and the resulting climate
change3—held the Copenhagen Summit with the aim of providing legal and political direction
with respect to the future of the international climate regime after 2012.
According to the UNFCCC, the Summit was held in accordance with the 2007 Bali
Roadmap, which was adopted at the UNFCCC’s 2007 conference on climate change in Bali,
Indonesia. The Bali Roadmap consists of several decisions that represent the many paths needed
to reach a secure climate future, including deforestation and forest management, technology for
developing countries, the establishment of an Adaptation Fund Board and a review of the
financial mechanism.4 The Bali Road Map includes the Bali Action Plan, which plotted the
course for a new negotiating process intended to tackle climate change by 2009. Core elements
of the Bali Action Plan include the long-term goal for mitigation, adaptation, finance,
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technology, forests and measurement, reporting and verification.5
The Copenhagen Accord called for limits on temperature increases to two degrees
Celsius above preindustrial levels on the “basis of equity and in the context of sustainable
development” and for “deep cuts in global emissions” and the peaking of global and national
emissions.6 Furthermore, according to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, the main
features of the Copenhagen Accord include, “A process for countries to enter their specific
mitigation pledges by January 31, 2010; broad terms for the reporting and verification of
countries’ actions; a collective commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in ‘new and
additional’ resources in 2010-2012 to help developing countries reduce emissions; preserve
forests and a goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and private finance by 2020 to
address developing county needs.”7 The accord also called for the establishment of a
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, a mechanism to transfer money to better assist developing
countries in climate change mitigation, a High Level Panel to examine ways of meeting the 2020
finance goal, a new Technology Mechanism, and a mechanism to channel incentives for reduced
deforestation.”8
The Copenhagen Summit failed in many ways, particularly from a legal and political
perspective. The provisions of the accord did not give a specific time frame for the limit of the
global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius. Furthermore, the accord did not specify
which countries must cut emissions nor did it specify by when. Thus, this left developed nations
free to continue emitting, as there were no set time-bound targets for emission reductions from
industrialized countries. Because the accord rested on a voluntary and domestic target for
emission reduction, it lacked powerful rules and procedures for the international community to
Elliot Dringer “Summary: Copenhagen Climate Summit” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, accessed on
February 6, 2014, http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop-15/summary.
6
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adopt to mitigate climate change.9
The divide between the developed and the developing world was apparent at the Summit.
Developing countries did not receive what they wanted in terms of financial assistance and
developed countries did not agree to binding mitigation commitments. Thus, developing
countries were forced to settle for what developed countries were offering, since they would only
acquire the funding if they were to agree with the accord. This meant that if they were to not
agree with the accord, they would not receive any funding for climate change mitigation. This
put developing countries in a problematic position, as they felt that none of these options truly
worked to their benefit to assist them in adapting and alleviating the harsh climatic conditions
that they were experiencing. Furthermore, developing countries were put under significant
amount of economic and external political pressure to endorse the accord. As a result, they
decided to join partly because they wanted to get what they could out of the funding in order to
alleviate the dire climatic impacts they were facing. Overall, the Accord failed to significantly
protect developing countries from climate change. The Summit left these countries questioning
the prospects for significant further progress within an international U.N. negotiation process.10

The 2010 Cancun Agreements
The Cancun Agreements, reached on December 11 in Cancun, Mexico, at the 2010
United Nations Climate Change Conference, were a set of significant decisions made by the
international community to address the long-term challenge of climate change collectively and
comprehensively over time and to take concrete action to speed up the global response. The
agreements established objectives for reducing human-generated greenhouse gas emissions over
time to keep the global average temperature rise below two degrees Celsius and encouraged the
participation of all countries in reducing these emissions, in accordance with each country’s
9
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different responsibilities and capabilities to do so. In addition, the agreements aimed to mobilize
the development and transfer of clean technology to boost efforts to address climate change and
provide for scaled-up funds in the short and long term to enable developing countries to take
greater and effective action.11
Unlike the Copenhagen Accord, the Agreements particularly aimed to assist vulnerable
countries in adapting to the inevitable impacts of climate change, as well as to protect the
world’s forests and build up global capacity, especially in developing countries, to meet the
overall challenge.12 Although the Cancun Conference did produce voluntary commitments from
the most important developed and developing nations, these commitments left at the very
minimum “a five gigatonne gap between emissions levels that will only be achieved if there is
full compliance with the voluntary emissions reductions and what is necessary to prevent a two
degrees Celsius rise.” 13
Most participants in the conference acknowledged that these provisions were not enough
to combat climate change. Although the accord required developed countries to submit and
implement mitigation actions, it did not suggest a cumulative quantitative mitigation goal. This
left developing countries unhappy for the most part.14 Moreover, its provision to limit the
temperature to two degrees Celsius did not sit well with small-island developing countries as
groups like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) had been advocating for a limit of 1.5
degrees Celsius,15 after most scientists believed that even a two degrees Celsius temperature rise
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could cause very dangerous climate change. However, it was an amount that had been adopted as
the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC.16

The 2011 Durban Outcomes
According to the Doha Carbon and Energy Forum 2013, a Briefing Paper on climate
change, the Durban negotiations resulted in the establishment of a second commitment period
under the Kyoto Protocol from 2013 to 2020. At Durban, South Africa, parties agreed to
negotiate a global agreement that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and be agreed upon by 2015
and executed in 2020. Other significant outcomes from Durban included “the decision for longterm cooperative action under the Convention that sought to operationalize decisions taken in
Cancun in the areas of climate finance, transparency and reporting, the periodic review,
adaptation, technology, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)
and agreement on the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund and the Technology
Mechanism.”17
However, according to Donald Brown, an author and critic of the Copenhagen Accord,
the agreement to cooperate on a new binding legal instrument was only a commitment to
negotiate an agreement, about which almost none of the major issues had been settled, coupled
with the fact that the new agreement is not likely to become effective until 2020. Brown opposed
the Durban deal, emphasizing that it failed to put into place national greenhouse gas emissions
reduction commitments that will prevent catastrophic climate change, did not allocate national
commitments on the basis of equity, nor provide a just response to the needs of the most
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vulnerable to climate change to take necessary adaptation steps. 18
Although the Durban agreement managed to create a Green Climate Fund
to serve as a financial mechanism to manage adaptation funding, it failed to identify
dedicated sources of funding to implement an adaptation agenda that is based upon “mandatory”
contributions to “new,” “predictable,” and “additional” sources of funding. With that said,
developed countries failed to fulfill the ethical standards for sufficient funding for adaptation
programs needed in more vulnerable developing countries.19

The 2012 Doha Climate Gateway
At the 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, countries adopted The Doha
Climate Gateway to represent a new commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries at
Doha agreed on an agenda to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015 and agreed on a
“track to raise necessary determination to respond to climate change with an aim to establish
legal force applicable to all countries starting in 2020.” 20 Furthermore, according to the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP)—a United Nations agency formed in 1972 which acts as
“the voice for the environment within the United Nations system”21— developed countries at
Doha aimed to support developing countries by agreeing on ways and means to deliver scaled-up
climate finance and technology to them beyond 2013. They also established a web-based registry
for governments to record developing country mitigation actions that seek recognition or
financial support. In addition, they created a new work program for developing countries to build
capacity through climate change education and training, and established new market mechanisms
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outside of the UNFCCC, such as nationally-administered or bilateral offset programs to help
meet their mitigation targets.22
At Doha, governments further clarified ways to measure deforestation, and to ensure that
efforts to fight deforestation are supported. They also looked at ways to support the effectiveness
and environmental integrity of projects under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development
Mechanism, which includes carbon capture and storage, an option for reducing atmospheric
emissions of CO2 from human activities.23 Moreover, countries embarked on work
to enable the development and transfer of technologies to help developing countries adapt
and curb their emissions.24
In response to the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, developing countries called for
compensation, also known as “loss and damage” from high emitting developed countries for
future climate change impacts in their countries.25 Led by the government of Bangladesh,
developing countries created the “Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative,” in 2012,
which was a report that laid out evidence of the then current relationships between climatic
stressors, societal impacts, responses and outstanding loss and damage.26 This was significant as
it highlighted how societies in developing countries are forced to deal with and manage the
negative impacts of climate change, and further stressed the need for financial compensation
from developed countries in this respect.27
Although the Doha Climate Gateway focused more on establishing initiatives to fulfill
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the needs of developing countries, the Doha conference still only established limited progress in
advancing international talks on climate change and failed to set more ambitious goals for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. That failure was seen as contributing to increasing the risk
of a rise in average global temperatures by two degrees Celsius by the end of this century.
Moreover, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), in their 2012 Emissions Gap Report,
stressed that “if the world does not accelerate action on climate change, total greenhouse gas
emissions could rise to 58 gigatonnes by 2020 (compared to 40 gigatonnes in 2000), far above
the level scientists say would likely keep temperature rises below 2 degrees Celsius.”28
Furthermore, studies by the World Bank indicate that even with these commitments and pledges
fully implemented, there is approximately a 20 percent possibility that temperature increases
would top 4 degrees Celsius by the end of this century, which could trigger a cascade of
catastrophic climatic changes including extreme heat-waves, declining global food stocks and
rising sea levels, which could severely affect hundreds of millions of people, especially those in
developing countries which are the most vulnerable .29

The 2013 Conference in Warsaw
As described by the UNFCCC, governments convened at the Warsaw Climate Change
Conference in 2013, where they united in developing key decisions to further advance the
Durban Platform, the Green Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance and the Warsaw Framework
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), which are a set of
decisions on ways to reduce these emissions. A rulebook for reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation was agreed on, together with measures to boost forest
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preservation and the establishment of a results-based payment system to promote forest
protection. The Green Climate Fund planned to be a major channel of financing for developing
world action, as it aimed to support projects, policies, activities and programs in developing
countries.30
Additionally, after much prior deliberation on the issue, governments agreed to form the
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage to address loss and damage caused by
long-term climate change impacts in developing countries. Specifically, the mechanism aimed to
facilitate the exchange of information and best practices for dealing with climate change-induced
losses and damages, as well as strengthen action and support, including by facilitating the
mobilization of finance.31 In turn, developing countries, under the UNFCCC, finalized a
comprehensive set of plans to deal with climate change impacts, which aimed to better evaluate
the immediate impacts of climate change and help enable them to determine the support and
actions they require to become more resistant and prepared. 32
At the Warsaw Conference, governments acknowledged the limited time to keep
warming to a maximum of under two degrees Celsius. The urgency for the reduction in global
greenhouse gas emissions by the second half of this century was apparent. To achieve the
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, governments agreed that it was critical that action must
be carried out and coordinated quickly at all levels, which included the international, domestic,
business and finance. For this reason, the Warsaw Conference provided a showcase for climate
action by business, cities, regions and civil society.33 Yet, although it was apparent that the world
had the necessary tools to succeed in combating climate change, it was clear at Warsaw that the
tensions between the developed, the advanced developing and the developing world still stood as
“Warsaw Outcomes,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed on February 10,
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a major barrier that prevented the international community to reach a successful solution.
On the one hand, although the Conference made much progress, developing countries–
once again–found themselves leaving quite unsatisfied with the outcomes. Countries had agreed
a year earlier to address “loss and damage” in Warsaw, and the issue took on new importance
when Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines just days before the Warsaw conference. Smallisland states and other particularly vulnerable developing countries that had grouped together
on the climate change negotiations had pressed for years for greater attention to “loss
and damage” resulting from extreme events and slow-onset impacts such as sea-level rise. As
parties planned to reach a decision in Warsaw on “institutional arrangements” addressing loss
and damage, Typhoon Haiyan put the issue front and center.34
Developed countries, specifically the United States and the European Union, opposed the
“loss and damage” mechanism. This opposition riled developing countries, and the Conference
took a turn for the worse. At one point, the Conference neared collapse after developing
countries walked out.35 Even after exhausting hours of deliberation, the “loss and damage”
mechanism fell well short of what developing countries wanted. Parties established a new forum
to provide information and expertise, and to consider further steps, but neither advanced
developing or developed countries made any promise of additional funding.36
As part of the Copenhagen and Cancun agreements, developed countries pledged $30
billion in climate finance from 2010 through 2012 (known as the “fast start” period) and to
mobilize $100 billion a year in public and private finance for developing countries by 2020.
However, at Warsaw, developed countries refused to set a quantified interim goal for ramping up
climate finance, even though developing countries, concerned by a lack of progress in ramping
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up finance, made an attempt to push for an interim goal of $70 billion by 2016.37
The Warsaw round ended with decisions on historical responsibility and emission
reductions pushed off to the future. Like past conferences, parties ruled out binding emission
targets for any nation. At Warsaw, it was apparent that still, no real progress had been made and
time was running out. It has been evident that advanced developing and developed nations have
consistently taken positions based upon national economic interest rather than assisting
developing countries. However, to prevent a catastrophic temperature increase by the end of the
century, more action needs to be taken.38
The outcomes of these negotiations have both reflected and exacerbated the tensions
between groups that have been formed in response to climate change, such as the small-island
states among the developing countries, advanced developing countries such as China and India,
and the developed world. The priorities of developing countries have not significantly
been considered by the advanced developing and developed world. As a result, no clear solution
has been established to assist developing countries; thus they have been left extremely
unsatisfied throughout these negotiations. Nonetheless, all groups will have to
coordinate more together to develop solutions before it is too late.39
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY-KENYA

Climate Change in Kenya
Figure 4.1: Map of Kenya

Source-Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2011.

Kenya, a country located in East Africa, has a diverse geography and climate. While the
southeast part of Kenya borders the Indian Ocean with warm tropical beaches, Kenya’s
Kilimanjaro Mountains hold year-round snow. Other regions include desert, grasslands and
forests. Kenya's climate is as varied as the land areas; the evenings in the Central Highlands can
be frigid while coastal areas are usually hot and humid. Typically, there are two rainy seasons;
the long rains in March-May, and the short rains in September-October.1
There are approximately forty-two million people living in Kenya (July 2013 est.) 2
According to The Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) — an environmental advocacy group
composed of scientists, economists, attorneys and other professionals who aim to preserve the
environment — climate change has had a severe impact on Africa, as more intense rainfall and
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droughts have occurred due to the speeding up of the cycling of water between the ocean,
atmosphere and land, which is all associated with global warming.3 Extreme weather events and
the overall increase in temperature throughout the years has harmed rural regions like Kenya, as
this region has been particularly vulnerable to the effects of global warming.4
The United Nations Development Program’s climate change country profile on Kenya
shows that Kenya’s mean annual temperature has increased by one degree Celsius since 1960.5
According to a report made by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), warming in
Kenya is expected to accelerate with temperatures rising by nearly three degrees Celsius by
2050.6 Along with the temperature rising, sea-levels have also risen and are expected to rise 0.3
meters in the near future. As a result, Mombasa — Kenya’s second largest city and a prime
tourism spot located on Kenya’s east coast — is particularly threatened by the great likelihood
of flooding. This could lead to serious problems such as land being submerged, damaging
erosion, biodiversity loss, the relocation of homes and a weakened tourism sector, all of which
would be unfavorable to Kenya’s economy. 7
Additionally, the climate has had a critical effect on Mount Kenya, Kenya’s highest
mountain. The reduction in cold temperatures has depleted the mountain’s glaciers, which are a
vital natural resource of fresh water for the city.8 The recent prolonged and severe droughts and
flooding (See Figure 4.2) have resulted from the changing climate as well. With that said,
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Kenya’s trends in temperature, sea levels, rainfall and extreme climatic events all point to clear
evidence of climate change.
Figure 4.2: Kenya’s Erratic Rainfall Trends, 1969-2009.

Source- United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2011.
(The India-Pacific Index is a measure of temperature and precipitation over the Indian and
western Pacific Ocean).

Kenya’s Vulnerability to Climate Change
The Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI), developed by the global risk advisory
firm Maplecroft, identifies climate-related risks to a country’s population, business and
government. According to Maplecroft, the CCVI evaluates three factors to come to its findings:
a country’s exposure to extreme climate-related events, including sea level rise and future
changes in temperature, precipitation and specific humidity; the sensitivity of populations, in
terms of health, education, agricultural dependence and available infrastructure; and the adaptive
capacity of countries to combat the impacts of climate change, which encompasses research and
development, economic factors, resource security and the effectiveness of government.9
The CCVI has used this evaluation to measure Kenya’s vulnerability to climate change,
“Maplecroft | 31% of Global Economic Output Forecast to Face ‘High’ or ‘Extreme’ Climate Change Risks by
2025 – Maplecroft Risk Atlas.” Maplecroft Global Risks Analytics, (October 30, 2013),
https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2013/10/30/31-global-economic-output-forecast-face-high-orextreme-climate-change-risks-2025-maplecroft-risk-atlas/.
9
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and has ranked Kenya as highly vulnerable to climate change in the years from 2009 to 2013.
The following two figures (See Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4) are global maps, produced by
Maplecroft, which illustrate the high vulnerability to climate change which Kenya and its people
face compared to the rest of the world.
Figure 4.3: Kenya’s High CCV, 2011.

Source- Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics, 2011. Available at: The Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/green/pdfs/ClimateChangeVulnerabilityIndex2011.pdf.
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Figure 4.4: Human Vulnerability Due to Climate Change

Source- Thow and Blois (2008). Available at:
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E5549F80673D1E38C12574B0004B698Fcare_mar2008.pdf.

As I describe in detail in the following sections, Kenya has faced reduced
agricultural production, the worsening of food security, an increased incidence of both flooding
and drought, and the spread of diseases and scarce land and water resources due to climate
change. Furthermore, the destruction of African forests has caused an increase in CO2 emissions,
which has further exacerbated global warming. 10 As Kenya is a developing country where its
people traditionally rely heavily on its climate, geography and natural resources to make a living,

Karim Dahou, Doreen Kibuka-Musoke, Brian Ngo and Francesca Pavarini. (2012). “Climate Challenges to
Africa, A Call for Action.” OECD Journal: General Papers, pp. 4, 8.
10
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the changing climate has hampered the country from prospering, which in turn has contributed to
its inability to acquire the adequate funding needed to properly mitigate and adapt to climate
change.11
I.

Economy, Poverty and Development
Throughout recent years, there has been a substantial number of Kenyans living in

poverty, with about fifty percent of them in 2010 living below the poverty line.12 According to
the CIA World Fact Book, Kenya’s unemployment rate is high at around forty percent.13 Charles
C. Mutai and Samuel O. Ochola have noted that extreme weather events have serious economic
implications in Kenya, as the increase in frequency and intensity of floods and droughts over the
last decade have caused damage to property and loss of life, reduced business opportunities and
increased the cost of doing business. The poor, who make up the majority of people living in
Kenya, have little protection against extreme climatic events. They have few resource reserves,
poor housing and depend on natural resources for their livelihoods.14 Rural poverty in Kenya is
also strongly linked to environmental concerns, especially poor water management, soil erosion,
declining soil fertility and land degradation. Climate change is one of the major challenges
facing the Kenyan economy, as it has dwindled its resource base and has contributed to declining
agricultural yields.15 Moreover, according to the World Bank, Kenya is classified as a low
income country, with a GDP at$44.10 billion (2013) .16 Additionally, the effects of climate
change have threatened Kenya's tourism industry, a key source of Kenya’s revenue.17
11

Ibid. p. 24.
“Kenya Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper- Vision 2030 First Medium Term Plan” Country Report No. 10/224
International Monetary Fund, (2010), p. 18, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10224.pdf.
13
The World Factbook “Economy-Overview” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), accessed on March 11, 2014,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html.
14
Charles C. Mutal and Samuel O. Ochola, “Chapter 3-Climate Change and Variability.” In the Kenya State of the
Environment and Outlook 2010 Supporting the Delivery of Vision 2030. National Environment Management
Authority, Nairobi, Kenya, (2011): 46-60: 46.
15
“Rural Poverty in Kenya.” Rural Poverty Portal, accessed on March 4, 2014,
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/kenya.
16
The World Bank, “Kenya | Data.” Accessed March 1, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya.
12
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Furthermore, climate change has contributed to Kenya’s chronic budget deficits,
inflationary pressures and sharp currency depreciations. Additionally, although low global food
and fuel prices and monetary interventions provided by Kenya’s Central Bank have provided
some relief for the country following 2012, 18 it is apparent that climate change has taken a
significant toll on Kenya’s economy and in order for the economy to improve, measures to
mitigate climate change must be implemented.
II.

Desertification
Desertification — the process by which an area becomes a desert — happens from the

depletion of plant life and land degradation. Desertification, which has stemmed from global
warming, has presented a major economic barrier to Kenya’s development. Erratic weather
patterns, such as severe droughts and flooding, have resulted in major land degradation and poor
land use throughout Kenya. The exploitation of Kenya’s forests has further contributed to
desertification as well. As rural communities make up the majority of Kenya, desertification has
been widespread and has severely threatened the livelihoods of farmers and their families who
typically make a living off of growing and selling their crops and livestock.19
III.

Food Security
The level of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, the region where Kenya is located,

has been very high. In this region, more than 150,000 deaths resulted from climate change
scenarios like global warming.20 For example, severe droughts which occurred in 2010 and 2011
resulted in four million people requiring food assistance.21 Climate change has posed the greatest
“National Climate Change Response Strategy” Government of Kenya, (April, 2010): 35.
“The World Factbook-Economy Overview.” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on March 11, 2014.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html.
19
“Preparing for Climate Change in Kenya.” International Institute for Sustainable Development, (2008), accessed
on March 9, 2014, p. 2, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/preparing_for_climate.pdf.
20
Larry West. "Global Warming - Global Warming Leads to 150,000 Deaths Every Year." Environmental Issues News and Information about the Environment. (November 27, 2011).
17
18
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threat to agriculture and food security, especially in poor agriculture-based countries like Kenya.
Most of the small scale farmers who produce food for subsistence as well as income generation
are unable to meet their basic food needs daily. The most affected members of the population are
women and children, who are more often poorer, and whose daily activities include farming,
fishing, and herding, among others. These groups depend mostly on water, and even where
irrigated agriculture is practiced, Kenya’s natural water resources have been drying up in the
recent past as a result of climate change. 22
Changes in Kenya’s agro-ecological conditions, attributable to climate change, affect
food production. Lands in low latitude areas have lost their agricultural suitability, which has
caused a decrease in food availability and production. Moreover, because global warming is
expected to be a long-standing issue, food insecurity will likely be a frequent occurrence and a
long term issue a well. Food insecurity will also contribute to a reduction of wild ecosystems,
animal death and biodiversity loss.23 (See Figure 4.5).

“Rural Poverty in Kenya.” Rural Poverty Portal.
Robert Mburia, “Climate Change and Food Security Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa” Climate Emergency InstituteClimate Science Library, (2011), http://www.climateemergencyinstitute.com/food_sec_subsaharan_mburia.html.
23
Ibid.
21
22
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Figure 4.5: Estimated Food Security Levels in Kenya, Africa, 2011

Food security and rural livelihoods are inherently linked to water availability and use.
As a result of climate change, Kenya has faced challenges in water provision with erratic weather
patterns in the past few years causing droughts and water shortages. Kenya has a limited
renewable water supply and is classified as a water scarce country with only 15 percent of its
available water resources developed.24 As of 2012, access to safe water supplies throughout
Kenya is 59 percent and access to improved sanitation is 32 percent.25 Household access to safe

“Kenya Country Strategy Paper 2014-2018” African Development Bank Group, (2014), p. 7,
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/2014-2018__Kenya_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
24
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water, notably in rural areas, has remained low. Despite improvements after 2012, only 70.5
percent of urban households and 49.2 percent of rural households have had access to safe water,
thus, there is still an unmet need in rural and urban areas for both clean water and sanitation.26
IV.

Health
Due to the water shortage and food insecurity brought on by climate change in Kenya, the

health of millions of Kenyans have been compromised. In particular, women and young children
are at great risk, as water contamination has greatly threatened proper and safe maternal care.
For instance, hospitals in Kenya like the Kakamega Provincial District General Hospital have to
collect buckets of water which are then provided to its patients. The water is polluted with
bacteria, viruses and parasites and many patients develop different diseases such as typhoid,
malaria and cholera as a result. Waterborne diseases are the leading cause of death in African
children under the age of five, and since the hospitals in Kenya lack a sufficient supply of clean
water, women who give birth are likely to develop waterborne diseases and hundreds of newborns and infants die as a result. 27
People in Kenya often go hungry, as erratic weather patterns prevent farmers from
properly growing crops and they are unable to sell livestock. Children suffer and die from
malnutrition and disease, and of those who survive, half are stunted physically or mentally.
Climate change has exacerbated the inadequate and unprotected water and food supplies, which
has led to problems such as poor sanitation and hygiene, overcrowding, and limited availability
of resources. As a result, diseases like Cholera, remain a major public health problem that
causes substantial morbidity and mortality in Kenya.28 Moreover, the lack of food and fresh
“Kenya-The Water and Sanitation Crisis” water.org, accessed on March 12, 2014,
http://water.org/country/kenya/.
26
“Kenya Country Strategy Paper” Africa Development Bank Group, p.7.
27
Njeru, Gitonga, “Kenya: Climate Change Water Crisis Impacts Hospital Maternal Care” Women’s News Network
(2010), accessed on March 15, 2014, http://womennewsnetwork.net/2010/07/13/kenya-climate-change-water-crisisimpacts-hospital-maternal-care/.
25
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water sources often gives rise to a vicious cycle in which infectious diseases lead or contribute to
aggravated hunger, making communities more susceptible to these diseases, which may further
lead to reductions in labor productivity, thereby increasing poverty, morbidity and mortality.
As my hypothesis states that only when developing countries actually begin to feel the
impacts of climate change are they likely to participate actively in international and regional
negotiations, it is indeed evident that Kenya, a developing country, has been highly vulnerable to
the effects brought on by the changing environment. The following section will review Kenya’s
approach to climate change and its participation in the recent international climate change
negotiations. Then, through quantitative analysis, I will determine involvement by examining a
set of factors, which include (1) how many negotiations they attended and attendance at other
relevant sessions; (2) the number of people in the Kenya’s delegation and proportion of highlevel delegates; (3) the number of times, if any, Kenya spoke at these sessions; (4) the number of
times, if any, Kenya presented a proposal; and (5) if Kenya led, advocated, or sponsored on
behalf of other developing countries. Ultimately, I will investigate whether or not climate change
vulnerability was a direct motivator for high participation in the climate change negotiations, or
if there were any other conditions that affected participation.
Kenya’s Approach to Climate Change
Since 1965, Kenya has been involved in efforts aimed at addressing the environment and
problems associated with it. As illustrated in its Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the Kenyan
government had acknowledged concern over economic growth and development and that
environmental preservation was crucial in determining use of its land and natural resources.29 In
“Kenya Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper- Vision 2030 First Medium Term Plan (2008-2012) International
Monetary Fund (2010), pp.106-107, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10224.pdf.
29
Peter Nyarang’o “The Long Road to Universal Coverage” Strathmore University, (2010), p. 7,
http://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/ProfPeterNyarango.pdf.
28
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the years leading up to 2009, Kenya had made attempts to achieve sustainable development, as
illustrated by Kenya’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP);The Economic Recovery
Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS); and Kenya’s Development Blueprint
Vision 2030. Furthermore, the new Constitution of Kenya and relevant amendments that have
been incorporated over the years have reinforced the policy and legal basis of sustainable
development in Kenya.30 One of the most significant displays of Kenya’s commitment includes
its joining and ratification of three international treaties, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose aim is to cooperatively consider actions to
limit average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change, and to cope with
whatever impacts which were, by then, inevitable; the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity (UNCBD) and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).31
Kenya has displayed a consistent record on environmental issues. In 1994, it asked for
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) — a UN organization created in 1972
which serves as a voice for the environment within the UN system — to be located in Nairobi.
The Kenyan delegation at the time, led by former ambassador Joseph Odero-Jowi and the then
Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai, embarked on a major pursuit to secure UNEP for Nairobi.
However, Kenya was met with a negative international response, as the UN, which had never
headquartered its agencies in the developing world, was reluctant to locate UNEP in Nairobi.
Angry with the UN’s members’ cold response, the Kenyan delegation criticized the UN for not
acting as a true global organization, and continued to press for UNEP’s establishment in
Nairobi.32

“Sustainable Development in Kenya: Stocktaking in the run up to Rio+20,” Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations,
(2012), p. 2, accessed on March 4, 2014, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/985kenya.pdf.
31
Ibid. p. 1.
32
“UNEP-The First 40 Years A Narrative by Stanley Johnson,” United Nations Environment Programme (2012),
pp. 31-33, http://www.unep.org/pdf/40thbook.pdf.
30
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As Kenya publicly expressed their discontent with the UN system, Odero-Jowi, Kenya’s
then ambassador to the UN in New York, named the situation "unjust" and immediately called
for New York, Geneva, London and Vienna to withdraw from bidding to host UNEP.
Meanwhile, Mungai successfully pushed other African states to have a common stand on hosting
the new body in Africa. After Mungai came to an agreement with other African states, he
delivered a speech in which he emphasized that no UN headquarters had yet been established in
Asia, South America, Africa, or Eastern Europe.”33
Mungai’s speech, along with the lobbying of a powerful delegation provided by Kenya,
convinced several African, Caribbean, and other non-African countries thereafter to side with
Nairobi as the pick for UNEP’s headquarters. This was a major achievement for Kenya, Africa
and the developing world as a whole, as the United Nations General Assembly had mandated
UNEP to provide leadership in addressing issues surrounding climate change in the African
region.34 The successful establishment of UNEP in Nairobi, along with Kenya’s strong efforts
and interest in environmental matters, are a clear indication that Kenya was extremely driven to
be involved long before the 2009-2013 negotiations took place. However, as Kenya has become
more vulnerable to climate change in recent years, (recall that Maplecroft ranks the country very
high on climate change vulnerability), it has become even more interested in international
climate change negotiations to combat environmental deterioration and to secure a safer and
more sustainable future. Furthermore, Kenya has established itself as a central country in Africa,
speaking on behalf of all countries within the continent about environmental matters.

33

Ibid.
UNEP “Climate Change in Kenya’ United Nations Environment Programme, accessed on March 12, 2014,
http://www.unep.org/roa/Programmes/KenyaCountryProgramme/KCP_Climate_Change/tabid/52011/Default.aspx.
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Kenya’s Role in the Negotiations: Delegate Representation
Kenya had a total number of 372 delegates and 72 high-level delegates at the five
climate change negotiations from 2009-2013, (not including other relevant sessions). By looking
at the Average Number of Delegates (AND) from Tanzania, Sudan and Myanmar at these
negotiations, which are similar countries in terms of population and wealth, I have compared
Kenya’s Delegation Count (DC) to the AND to see how Kenya ranks in terms of its
representation at the negotiations (See Table 4.1). Tanzania sent 250 delegates, Sudan sent 126
delegates, and Myanmar sent 15 delegates. As the Table illustrates, the AND of Tanzania, Sudan
and Myanmar is 130. According to the benchmark, since Kenya’s DC is 372 delegates, which is
well above the AND+25, Kenya ranks above the average representation and has earned 10
points as a result.
Table 4.1: Points for Delegate Representation in 2009-2013 Climate Change Negotiations

Benchmark:

DC is 25+ AND=country has above average representation (10 Points)
DC is 10-25 more than AND=(8 points)
DC is AND +/- 10= country has average representation (5 Points)
DC is less than AND-10= country has below average representation (2 Points)
Average Number of
Delegates (AND):
130

Kenya’s Total
Delegate Count (DC):
372

Benchmark:
DC greater than
AND+25

Points Earned: 10

In order to determine overall involvement, I have added the ten points earned for
Kenya’s delegate representation in Table 4.2 on the following page.
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Kenya’s Role in the Negotiations: Determining Involvement

Table 4.2: Determining Involvement
Number of times
for Attendance at
Negotiations:5
Attendance at
Other African
Sessions:1

Number of
Points for
Delegate
Representation
at Negotiations:
10 points

Number of
High-Level
Delegates:
72 (19.4%)*8 points

Number
of times
Kenya
Spoke: 8

Number of
times
Kenya
Presented a
Proposal: 8

Did Kenya
Lead,
Advocate or
Sponsor for
Other
Developing
Countries?
Yes=3

Number
of Points:
43

* Kenya’s high-level delegation percentage is just below the range for countries scoring ten points. Its score
has been modified to reflect this. To see the scale of percentage ranges and points, refer to chapter 2.

41-50 points
31-40points
21-30 points
11-20 points
0-10 points

A+ grade
A grade
B grade
C grade
D grade

Table 4.2 represents an assessment of Kenya’s involvement in the recent climate change
negotiations. According to the table above, Kenya received a total of 43 points, which gives it an
A plus level grade exemplifying exceptional participation. Kenya attended all five negotiations
and attended one other special session in Africa, the 2009 Pan-African Summit, to get a
combined score of six. As previously noted, Kenya received 10 points for its delegate
representation as a result of its 372-member delegation, which ranks well above the average
representation when compared to similar countries. Kenya also received eight points for sending
72 high-level delegates. Furthermore, during the various negotiations, Kenya spoke eight times,
presented a proposal eight times, and advocated on behalf of other countries. Thus, in reference
to the analysis, Kenya has been very highly proactive and greatly committed throughout all of
the negotiations.
Through Kenya’s high attendance at all five negotiations and one other African session,
along with its 372-member delegation and a total of 72 high-level delegates, Kenya established a
49

powerful platform to deliver its requests and negotiate with other countries in a strong and
influential manner. Kenya’s high-level delegation included: Kenya’s then President
Mwai Kubaki, who attended the 2009 Pan-African Summit and the 2009 Copenhagen Summit;
Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who attended the 2009 Copenhagen Summit and the 2010 Cancun
Conference; and Kenya's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Environment and Mineral
Resources, Ali Mohammed, who attended the 2011 Durban Conference and the 2012 Doha
Climate Gateway. In addition, attending the Copenhagen Summit were: John Michuki,
Kenya’s Minister for Environment and Natural Resources; Dr. Noah Wekesa, Minister of
Forestry and Wildlife; Moses Wetangula, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Kiraitu Murungi,
Minister of Energy.35

I.

Proposals

Throughout the negotiations, Kenya put forward several significant proposals about
achieving worldwide sustainable development. Kenya's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Environment and Mineral Resources, Ali Mohammad and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, along
with the rest of Kenya’ delegation, presented eight statements/proposals that stood out:
(1) At the 2011 Cancun negotiations, Kenya requested $100 billion a year until 2020 and
$30 billion in fast-track financing to be made available from 2010 to 2012. Kenya asked
for half of the fast-track financing to go to grants and adaptation.36
(2) At the 2012 Durban negotiations, Kenya proposed for developed country parties to adopt
a 2nd commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol covering the period 2013-2017 with
ambitious quantifiable targets without any conditionality’s. 37

Dave Opiyo, “Kibaki leads Strong Kenya Team to Climate Talks,” Daily Nation News (2009), accessed on
October 3, 2014, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/820114/-/3d4uo4z/-/index.html.
36
“Statement of Rt. Hon. Raila A. Odinga at COP 16” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
accessed on October 3, 2014,
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/statements/application/pdf/101207_cop16_hls_kenya.pdf.
37
“Statement by the Hon. John N. Michuki, Minister of Environment and Mineral Resources, Kenya, at the High
Level Segment of COP 17, Durban, South Africa. (December 7, 2011.) United Nations Framework Convetnion on
Climate Change, p.3.
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(3) Also at Durban, Kenya urged for similar and comparable targets of a 2nd commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol to be taken by developed countries that are not parties to
the Kyoto Protocol.38
(4) At the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, Kenya acknowledged the uncertainty of financial
support between the end of the fast start finance period of 2012. Thus, Kenya demanded
that a financing target and a process toward the realization of $100 billion must be
agreed in Doha.39
(5) Also at Doha, Kenya submitted a proposal for advancing the goal of gender balance, in
which it supported improvement in the participation of women in the UNFCCC
negotiations and in the representation of parties established pursuant to the Convention
of the Kyoto Protocol.40
(6) In the months leading up to the Warsaw talks, Kenya created a Readiness Preparation
Proposal (R-PP), which outlined the process by which the Government of Kenya would
develop its national strategy for participating in an evolving international mechanism for
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conserving and enhancing
stocks and sustainably managing forests (REDD+).41 (REDD alone refers to reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries).42 At
Warsaw, Kenya used this framework to press for the facilitation of the implementation
of REDD+ activities in developing countries.43
(7) At the Warsaw talks, Kenya requested for direct access to the Green Climate Fund,
reiterated key principles on climate financing and called for the continuation of funding
to support ambitious climate action in developing countries.44
(8) Also at the Warsaw talks, Kenya called for the establishment of an international
mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change in developing
countries.45
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“Statement by Mr. Ali Daud Mohamed, COP 18.” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
(December 6, 2012) p. 3,
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Kenya’s Submission to the UNFCCC on Gender Balance Decision 23/CP. 18, accessed on September 3, 2014, p.
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“REDD Readiness Preparation Proposal for Kenya | The REDD Desk.” Accessed on December 6, 2014,
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II.

An Advocate for Other Countries

In the several speeches, proposals and presentations that Kenya gave at the negotiations,
Kenya advocated not only for itself but also for other poorer developing countries that were
vulnerable and did not have the financial means to properly combat climate change. Kenya’s
strong advocacy at the negotiations is summarized below in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Kenya’s Support for Other Developing Nations
2009 Pan-African
Summit

2009 Copenhagen
Summit

2010 Cancun
Conference

2011 Durban
Conference

Kenya’s President Kibaki, on behalf of the African Union, urged
developing countries to come together to agree on creating an
international framework to deliver at Copenhagen that would be in
the best interest of Africa and other poor nations, as some of them
had been hit the worst by climate change.46
President Kibaki delivered a powerful speech when he addressed
the high-level segment of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC). He
reaffirmed Kenya’s commitment to environmental conservation
and emphasize the need to address the issue of climate change
along with the consequences Africa faced such as poverty, access
to energy, and food security.47
Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga announced a new partnership
with France, known as the Global Partnership on Clean Energy,
which would assist all countries in Africa and the most climate
vulnerable countries. The partnership aims to create a common
framework to mobilize financing for generation, distribution and
connectivity of renewable energy, enough to raise electricity by
100% by 2030.48
Kenya's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Environment and
Mineral Resources Ali Mohammed, on behalf of the African
Group, urged the international community to accelerate the process
towards a new climate treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which
would be based on compelling scientific evidence on rising
temperatures and their impact on vulnerable nations.49

“African Leaders Meet to Create Unified Climate Stance” VOA News, accessed on October 8, 2014,
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-10-13-voa44/414629.html.
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2012 Doha Climate
Gateway

2013 Warsaw Talks

Before the Doha conference, Ali Mohammed spoke on behalf of
developing countries to elaborate their common position that
included the desire for a new climate treaty, financing and new
technologies to help them make the transition to cleaner, “green”
economic practices. He called for all nations to address climate
change in order to achieve sustainable development and states that
Africa, small island developing states and least developed
countries continue to suffer most from the effects of climate
change.”50
Kenya’s delegation, on behalf of the African Group, engaged the
global community on negotiations relating to climate change
adaptation measures and reiterated its concern over the lack of
funding from richer countries needed for adaptation in poorer,
developing countries.51

As illustrated in the Table 4.3, Kenya advocated for at least three groups (Africa, least
developed countries and small island developing states, giving it three extra points. Its high-level
delegation joined with regional groups in Africa such as the African Group and the African
Union to promote greater environmental protection in Africa. Kenya also collaborated with the
Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) and the
African Ministers (a group of Ministers from 53 countries in Africa, including Kenya) at the
conferences to negotiate key matters that would be most beneficial to Africa in respect to climate
change.52
In addition, the African Group, with Kenya fully participating, took the opportunity at the
Warsaw Conference to meet with important leaders to discuss ideas about how the continent
could shift towards a more low-carbon future. Specifically, they met with UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-Moon to discuss plans concerning how Africa could implement sustainable development

Richard Munang and Zhen Han, “What does the Doha Climate Gateway Mean for Africa?” Africa Renewal
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52
“Africa Presents Common Position at Climate Change Negotiations.” (2014), The New Partnership for Africa’s
Development NEPAD Transforming Africa. http://www.nepad.org/nepad/news/3200/africa-presents-commonposition-climate-change-negotiations.
50

53

within its major cities. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon emphasized the important role cities
play in the urgent response to global climate change, and Kenya played a significant role in the
discussion as its capital, Nairobi, is a city that has engaged in plans to transform its urban
planning, home building and transportation to meet sustainable objectives for the future.53

Reasons for Kenya’s Good Performance

Vulnerability and Performance
It is proposed here that there is a positive link between Kenya’s vulnerability to climate
change and its performance in the climate change negotiations. In Maplecroft’s CCVI, (See
Figure 4.3), Kenya’s level of vulnerability to climate change was classified as “very high”
between 2009 and 2013, as climate change had taken a toll on Kenya’s economic, agricultural,
health, and food and water sectors. Moreover, Kenya’s officials, such as parliament member
David Koech, who served as chairman of the Pan-African Parliamentarians' Network on Climate
Change, cited the country’s vulnerability to the changing environment as a firm reason to be
committed to environmental affairs. At the Pan-African Summit, which was a meeting held by
African delegates in the months leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, Koech specifically
stated that Africans were calling for global action on climate change mitigation because they
continued to experience the harsh reality of an unfriendly climate. Speaking to the other
delegates, Koech stated,
Look at the animals that we lost the other day because of drought. Look at our lakes, they
are drying up. Look at our rivers, they are drying up. All of us are really feeling the
effect, and therefore the need to sign. But we must ensure that the developed world also
comes to support us in this endeavor.54
United Nations News Centre “At Climate Change Talks, Ban Stresses Major Role of Cities in Mitigating Impact.”
United Nations News Centre (2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46553#.VIR7YMknKZR.
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“African Leaders Meet to Create Unified Climate Stance” VOA News.
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In view of this vulnerability, President Kibaki urged African delegates at the Pan-African
Summit to use their capacity as political leaders to accept the challenge to combat climate
change. He stated,
I am aware that the path to a greener world is not easy but we must soldier on. We must
take aggressive initiatives to provide for the reduction of greenhouse gases and
domestication of international and regional conventions and protocol on climate
change.55
Kenya’s high vulnerability to climate change prompted the country to become even more active
in environmental issues than it already had been since the 1970s when it became the
headquarters of UNEP.

Other Factors:
Aid and Performance
As previously discussed, Kenya is a low income country. We also noted
that climate change has affected its ability to grow the economy, thus it is to be expected that
Kenya would need aid to assist it with countering climate change. Kenya has consistently asked
for aid for itself and others. Table 4.4 gives examples of aid that Kenya has received to combat
climate change. These projects have helped to improve various sectors in Kenya that have been
negatively affected by climate change and as a result have assisted in the country’s overall
development.

“UNEP Hosts African Parliaments Summit on Climate Change.” (2009). United Nations Environment
Programme. http://www.unep.org/climatechange/News/PressRelease/tabid/416/language/enUS/Default.aspx?DocumentId=599&ArticleId=6345.
55
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Table 4.4: Aid to Kenya to Counter Climate Change, 2008-2013.
Donor/Fund

Sector

Program/Project

Themes/Description

Funding

Special Climate
Change Fund
(SCCF), World Bank,
& UNDP
Multi-Donor, World
Bank as
Administrator
International Finance
Corporation (IFC)

Agriculture

Kenya: Adaptation to
Climate Change in Arid
Lands (KACCAL)56

Adaptation

$6.5 million

Agriculture

Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility (FCPF)57

REDD

$3.4 million

Energy

Climate Change Investment
Program for Africa (SIDA)58

$100 million
over 5 years

Nordic Development
Fund (NDF)
Spain (Main) &
Denmark, Norway.

Multiple

Climate Change Facility

Energy

Connection of a new wind
power project in Kenya’s
Lake Turkana region to the
national grid.

Spain (Main) &
Denmark, Norway.

Infrastructure

Connection of Kenya’s
landlocked Great Rift Valley
Region to the rest of the
country.

France-The Agence
Francaise de
Developement
(AFD).

Water &
Sanitation

Improvement of Kenya’s
water supply and sanitation
services as part of the
Millennium Cities
Initiative—a project of
Columbia University’s Earth
Institute.

Advisory Services and
Investment in Renewable
Energy
Innovative climate change
projects
Provides clean and
affordable energy and
enhanced energy
diversification all while
saving 16,000,000 tons of
C02 emissions.
Provides improved
infrastructure linked to the
wind farm, including a
road, fiber-optic cable and
electrification.
Public-private
partnerships were
developed to increase
water and sanitation
coverage in Kenya’s
informal settlements of
Nyalenda and Manyatta.

€2 million
€115 million

€115 million

$20 million

Sources: Norrington-Davis and Thornton (2011); The African Development Bank Group (2013);
and Blaustein (2010).

In addition, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), Kenya has received a large amount of development assistance (ODA) from developed
countries for environmental projects in recent years (See Table 4.5).
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The Adaptation to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Project (KACCAL) works to improve the ability
of participating districts and communities in the arid and semi-arid lands to plan and implement climate change
adaptation measures.
57
The Forest Partnership Carbon Facility (FCPF) is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society,
and Indigenous Peoples focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, forest carbon
stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in
developing countries (activities commonly referred to as REDD+).
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The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), is a government agency working on behalf
of the Swedish parliament and government, with the mission to reduce poverty in the world.
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Table 4.5: ODA to Kenya for the Environment
Allocation
Environmental
Policy &
Administrative
Management
Environmental
Education &
Training
Environmental
Research

2008
$5.5 M.

2009
$4 M.

2010
$4.6 M.

2011
$4.2 M.

2012

Total

$600,000

$18.9 M.

$100,000

$300,000

$100,000

$100,000

$400,000

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014).
Available at: www.stats.oecd.org

As illustrated in Table 4.4, Kenya was able to secure a substantial amount of funding
from the international community for various domestic protocols (in the forms of policy,
administrative management, research, education, and training) in order to be better equipped to
handle environmental issues. Thus, seeing how funding for environmental issues was a major
necessity, it is likely that the securement of environmental assistance was a factor besides
vulnerability that could explain Kenya’s high level of participation in the climate change
negotiations.
Prestige and Performance
The funding illustrated in the tables above greatly benefits Kenya’s drive to increase its
economic influence in the region. Given its continuous efforts to secure funding for the region
and for developing countries, it is likely that Kenya has been seeking to achieve a strong political
influence throughout Africa and gain prestige within the international community on the issue of
the environment. This was first demonstrated through its bid to secure the headquarters of the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in Nairobi. Since then, Kenya has cemented its
leadership through its active involvement throughout the negotiations on climate change.
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Assessment
Overall, two things stand out. First, Kenya scores very well on participation in the
climate change negotiations. Second, Kenya has pushed for financial aid both for developing
countries as a whole and for its own domestic projects. Since Kenya has not had the adequate
financial means to combat the harsh effects of climate change, it does not want to miss out on the
potential funding for development and climate change mitigation and adaption that could come
out of the negotiations. In addition, Kenya’s desire for prestige and political influence within the
East African region and the international community are two factors, aside from its own
vulnerability to climate change, that have motivated Kenya to be active in environmental
negotiations. As discussed, Kenya wants to be seen as a leader in environmental matters.
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY-QATAR

Climate Change in Qatar
Qatar, a small peninsula located in the Middle East, has a population of 2.1 million1
and borders the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. It is made up mostly of flat, barren desert,
and has arid and mild winters and very hot, humid summers.2 Climate change in recent years
has threatened Qatar’s environment, agriculture and health in many ways. For example,
desertification, a process of land degradation exacerbated by climate change, consumes the
country and droughts have resulted in limited access to very few natural fresh water resources.
However, though Qatar has faced environmental concerns, it has rapidly achieved prosperity and
economic, human, and social development. Qatar has advanced from position 57 to
34 out of 179 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index in less than a
decade.3
Figure 5.1: Map of Qatar

Source- West and Mustafa Al-Mulla (2013).
“Data-Qatar” The World Bank, accessed on October 15, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar.
“Qatar - Places in the News | Library of Congress.” Library of Congress, (2013), accessed on November 12, 2014,
http://www.loc.gov/today/placesinthenews/archive/2013arch/20130625_qatar.html.
3
“Qatar a Country at a Crossroads,” 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference, p. 3, accessed on November
5, 2014, http://www.cop18.qa/Portals/0/QATAR_RAND_V5_261112.pdf.
1
2
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While climate change has affected various sectors of the country, such as
Qatar’s environment and natural resource base, its booming economy has helped to prevent
significant environmental vulnerability. Due to the exploitation of large oil and gas
fields since the 1940s, Qatar has profited and relied heavily on oil and gas reserves, which has
substantially contributed to its expanding economy. As a result of Qatar’s economic boom, it has
been able to expand and rely heavily on alternative technologies to combat environmental
concerns. For example, Qatar has relied heavily on desalination, which is the process of filtering
water from the sea, streams and other water bases and converting it to fresh water.
According to Scientific American, although desalination is a practical technology used to
access clean, available water, it does pose long-term negative environmental risks. For instance,
desalination burns many more fossil fuels compared with the equivalent amount of fresh water
that is obtained from fresh water bodies. As such, the very proliferation of desalinization plants
around the world — approximately 13,000 which already supply fresh water in 120 nations,
primarily in the Middle East —is both a reaction to and one of the many contributors to global
warming.4 In addition, not only has climate change threatened Qatar’s marine environment,
which is at risk of warming and acidification,5 but the proliferation of desalinization in Qatar
and elsewhere could take a further destructive toll on ocean biodiversity and could damage
marine ecosystems. Through the process of desalination, pipes essentially vacuum up and
inadvertently kill millions of microbial organisms that constitute the base layer of the marine
food chain. Furthermore for every gallon of freshwater produced, another gallon of twice as
concentrated salt water must be disposed of, which creates a lasting salty muck that can
considerably harm marine ecosystems.6
“The Impacts of Relying on Desalination for Water,” Scientific American Magazine (January 20, 2009),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-impacts-of-relying-on-desalination/.
5
“Qatar a Country at a Crossroads,” 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference, p. 5.
4
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Human activity in Qatar has threatened the environment and there is the likelihood of
greater climate change in years to come. Qatar is one of the highest energy consumers of the
world and its carbon emissions per capita are the highest in the world, three times as high as the
United States.7 Qatar’s energy usage is very high, as fuel combusted during the production of
energy and energy-related products accounts for 67 percent of Qatar’s total CO2 emissions.8
Citizens are provided with free electricity and free water, but, as already mentioned, these are
produced by the energy-intensive activity of desalinating seawater. Moreover, energy demand is
rising by 7 percent a year to run the desalinators and air conditioners that maintain life in the
desert and the natural gas production equipment that funds it.9
As of 2011, Qatar’s rate of CO2 emissions from the consumption of energy was
estimated to be at 64.46 million.10 CO2 emissions stem from the burning of fossil fuels and the
manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid,
liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring (See Figure 5.2). Furthermore, the Brookings Doha
Center, which has undertaken research on the socio-economic and geopolitical issues facing
the broader Middle East,11 created a briefing paper on the Doha Carbon and Energy Forum
2013. The Doha and Energy Forum 2013 was a conference in Qatar that served as a premier
platform for country officials and international experts to discuss carbon dioxide emissions,
carbon abatement solutions, alternative energy, energy efficiency, and new technology in the
“The Impacts of Relying on Desalination for Water,” Scientific American Magazine.
Rachel Kaufman, “Pictures: Ten Countries With the Biggest Environmental Footprints” National Geographic,
accessed on October 8, 2014, http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/sustainable-earth/picturesten-countries-with-the-biggest-footprints/.
8
“Qatar a Country at a Crossroads,” 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference, p. 12.
9
Rachel Kaufman, “Pictures: Ten Countries With the Biggest Environmental Footprints.”
10
“The World Factbook, Middle East: Qatar” Central Intelligence Agency, p. 10, accessed on October 9, 2014,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_qa.pdf.
11
“Brookings Doha Center | Brookings Institution,” accessed on October 9, 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/doha.
6
7
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country.12 According to the briefing paper, Qatar has and must continue to take steps to reduce
carbon emissions and find alternative green technologies, such as implementing solar and
renewable energy sources to preserve the environment.13
Figure 5.2: CO2 Emissions from Qatar

Source-U.S. Department of Energy (2012). (Taken from Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/qat.html.)

Qatar’s Vulnerability to Climate Change
While Qatar is not characterized by Maplecroft’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index
(CCVI) as highly vulnerable to climate change —it is considered to be at “low risk” between
the years of 2009-2013 (See Chapter 4-Figure 4.3) — Qatar has faced pressing questions
from the international community related to the challenge of developing a sustainable future.
Qatar relies heavily on its large oil and gas reserves to fuel its economy. However, Qatar’s rapid
development has put the country at a crossroads; its rich fossil fuel resources have created both
economic opportunities as well as difficult environmental challenges.
“Doha Carbon & Energy Forum- About the Forum” Doha Carbon and Energy Forum, accessed on October 9,
2014, http://www.dcef-qatar.org/.
13
“Doha Carbon and Energy Forum-2013 Briefing Paper Solar Energy and Other Alternative Energy” Global
Economy and Development at Brookings, (2013), pp. 1-2, accessed on October 14, 2014, http://www.dcefqatar.org/app/media/7943.
12
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I.

Economy

Qatar is one of the richest countries in the Middle East and in the world. Possessing more
than 15 percent of the world's proven gas reserves, Qatar has ambitions to become a global
energy giant.14 With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of more than $180,000,
according to the World Bank (See Figure 5.3), Qatar has prospered in the last several years with
continued high real GDP growth. Despite the global financial crisis in 2009, Qatar has continued
to maintain steady economic growth. GDP is driven largely by changes in oil prices and by
investment in the energy sector.15 Qatar has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of
$85,550 (2013).16 Qatar’s economic policy is focused on developing its non-associated natural
gas reserves and increasing private and foreign investment in non-energy sectors. However, oil
and gas still account for more than 50 percent of GDP, roughly 85 percent of export earnings,
and 50 percent of government revenues.17
Oil and gas have made Qatar the world's highest per-capita income country and the
country with the lowest unemployment, which is less than 1 percent. Proved oil reserves in
excess of 25 billion barrels should enable continued output at current levels for about 57 years.
Qatar's proved reserves of natural gas exceed 25 trillion cubic meters, about 13 percent of the
world total and third largest in the world.18

“BBC News - Qatar Country Profile - Overview.” British Broadcasting Corporation News, (November 25, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14702226.
15
The World Factbook, “Economy Overview-Qatar” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on October 9, 2014,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
16
“Qatar | Data.” The World Bank, accessed on October 15, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar.
17
“The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency.
18
Ibid.
14
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Figure 5.3: Qatar’s GDP Growth 2004-2014.

Source-The World Bank/Trading Economics (2014).

II.

Desertification

Climate change has contributed to the growing rate of desertification in Qatar, which has
been widespread. Desertification in the Arab region remains a serious problem, as major hazards
are sand encroachment, salinity and erosion of cropland, and the frequent occurrence of sand
storms. Re-occurring droughts, which stem from climate change, have been the most serious
natural disaster that has affected the Arab region. In addition, droughts are one of the main
causes of desertification and desert encroachment when accompanied by inappropriate resource
practices. It is also projected that climate change will exacerbate drought implications and
negative impacts on the economies of Arab countries.19

III.

Agriculture and Food security

With no rivers, one of the world's lowest levels of rainfall, and a harsh desert
environment, Qatar's agricultural resources are very limited. The country has a land area of
11,590 square kilometers, of which only 1.1 percent is arable. Qatar's population has also

19

Ahmad Fares Asfary, Mohhamad S. Abido. (2005). Chapter 3-Land Resources. In The Environment Outlook for
the Arab Region: Environment for Development and Human Well-Being. Center for Environment and Development
in the Arab Region, p. 3. http://eoar.cedare.int/report/EOAR_Chapter%203%20%28EN%29.pdf.
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increased 300 percent, from 500,000 people in 1995 to 2 million people in 2014. With an
expanding population, an unfavorable climate and a decline of natural resources, it is apparent
that Qatar’s domestic agricultural production needs improvement and Qatar needs to preserve its
reserves of food and water.20
Although Qatar has been working to improve its agriculture sector through the
implementation of new technologies, Qatar imports 90 percent of its food, and there is still a
serious concern that food availability may be jeopardized by declines in global agricultural
productivity.21 Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 5.4 on the following page, Maplecroft
categorized Qatar at an “extreme risk’ in regards to water availability and it was ranked 2nd in the
world in water stress in 2012.22 While Qatar has had the financial means to combat these
grievances, average temperatures are only expected to rise, which may increase the chances of
severe droughts and soil evaporation rates in the future. Moreover, the change in rainfall amount
and patterns will be erratic and precipitation will increase in high latitudes. Equally, extreme
precipitation events are predicted to increase as well, and there will be higher soil erosion rates
and lower soil moisture. Overall, projected global warming will be extremely harmful to Qatar’s
crop production, agriculture yields and food security.23

‘Qatar's Journey to Self-Sufficiency: An Interview With Fahad Bin Mohammed Al-Attiya, Chairman of the Qatar
National Food Security Programme,” Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University. Global Food Security,
Vol. 67, No. 2, (Spring/Summer 2014):159-163.
21
Doha News Team, “- Doha News.” (June 30, 2013), Doha News, accessed on October 9, 2014.
http://dohanews.co/they-hassad-food-are-doing-some-revolutionary/.
22
“Maplecroft | Unsustainable Water Use Threatens Agriculture, Business and Populations Global Study.”
Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics (May 10, 2012), https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/newanalysis/2012/05/10/unsustainable-water-use-threatens-agriculture-business-and-populations-china-india-pakistansouth-africa-and-usa-global-study/.
23
Nadim Farajalla, “Climate Change and the Environment in the Arab World Program,” Issam Fares Institute for
Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, p. 40, accessed on October 11, 2014,
http://www.usp.br/nereus/wp-content/uploads/Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-the-Arab-World.pdf.
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Figure 5.4: Qatar Rated 2nd in the World for Extreme Risk of Water Availability.

Source- Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics (2012).

IV.

Health

Increasing temperatures, changes in the distribution and behavior of diseases, and
concentrations of air pollutants stemming from climate change have posed major health risks
to the people living in Qatar. Many suffer and die from non-communicable diseases, such as
cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, diabetes and cancer, and the sharp rise in poor air quality
has posed serious risks for some, especially those with heart problems and asthma as well as the
elderly and the very young.24 According to The World Health Organization (WHO), data from
2012 indicates that the air in Doha, the capital of Qatar, is some of the most polluted in the
world. Research concluded that Doha had the 12th highest average levels (93 ug/m3) of

“QSA: Harmful Air Particles Continue to Surpass Acceptable Limits in Qatar - Doha News.” Doha News Team,
(March 2, 2013) ; “Air Quality Deteriorating in Many of the World’s Cities.” World Health Organization, (May 7,
2014).
24
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Particulate Matter (PM) 2.5 – small and fine particles, which are particularly dangerous to the
health of those living there. Al Wakrah, another city in Qatar, had average levels (85 ug/m3) of
PM2.5, which ranked 25th on the same list.25
Moreover, in 2011, the Qatar Statistics Authority reported that more than double the
amount of the PM10 air pollutant was present in Doha (See Figure 5.6), which is another air
pollutant that is hazardous to one’s health. The concentration of particles in the air ranged from
105 to 185 micrograms per cubic meter at various spots around Doha. The annual recommended
limit is 50.
Figure 5.5: Air Quality in Doha, Qatar in 2011

Source- Qatar’s Statistics Authority (2013).

The deteriorating air quality has jeopardized the health of all people living in Qatar.
When the polluted air is inhaled, it could potentially damage internal organs, which could lead to
lung disease and other respiratory issues. PM2.5 particles can penetrate the respiratory tract, and
increase the risk of respiratory infections, lung cancer, heart disease and stroke. According to the
US Environment Protection Agency, these particles – which you often cannot see with the naked
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Victoria Scott, “WHO: Doha Ranked Among the World’s Most Polluted Cities” Doha News, (May 9, 2014).
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eye – are made up of heavy metals and toxic organic compounds, and their sources are usually
car exhausts, smelting plants and the burning of organic materials.
Qatar has seen pollution increase over the past several years, with one government report
citing the sand and dust created by the manufacturing industry and the soaring number of
construction projects, as well as increasing road congestion, as the main issues.26 Moreover,
potential future climatic events could cause related deaths, injuries, infectious diseases, and
stress.27 According to Nadim Farajalla, from the American University of Beirut in a
paper on the Impact of Climate Change on the Arab World, other health related disorders,
stemming from climate change, may arise in Qatar, including sensitive and infectious diseases
such as malaria, dengue fever, yellow fever, and encephalitis.28
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Qatar possesses high quality health
care, even by the standards of the industrialized countries. Life expectancy has risen sharply as
health care provision has improved. However, there is a need to strengthen Qatar’s health
system, as a lack of clarity exists between different stakeholders regarding health policy analysis,
strategic health planning, priority-setting, and coordination for monitoring and assessing health
risks such as those which stem from climate change.29 Furthermore, the World Bank notes that as
climate change continues, the national health ministries in Arab countries would benefit in
addressing the health effects of climate change by employing and authorizing climate change
specialists to help guarantee the sustainability of governmental efforts to adopt climate change
adaptation strategies.30
Victoria Scott, “WHO: Doha Ranked Among the World’s Most Polluted Cities.”
Nadim Farajalla, “Climate Change and the Environment in the Arab World Program,” p. 39.
28
Ibid.
29
“Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Qatar 2005–2009,”World Health Organization, Regional Office for
the Eastern Mediterranean, (2006), p. 7, accessed on August 1, 2014.
http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_qat_en.pdf?ua=1.
30
Dorte Verner ed. 2012. MENA Development Report, Adaptation to a Changing Climate in the Arab Countries.
Washington DC: World Bank. (2012), p. 328.
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Qatar’s Approach to Climate Change
Although Qatar attended negotiations on the environment as early as 1992, at the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), (also known as the Earth Summit) in
Rio, Brazil, its presence in the international climate change negotiations was rather minor up
until 2011. In that year, Qatar’s representatives first spoke out at the 2011 United
Nations High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly to Address Desertification, Land
Degradation and Drought in the Context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication.
Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, who was President of the United Nations General Assembly and
former permanent representative of Qatar to the UN, spoke at the meeting, where he publicly
acknowledged the threat of climate change to the Middle East and East Africa. He spoke about
the drastic effects of climate change on these two regions, which included extreme droughts and
the food crisis, noting that, “The economic, social and human cost of desertification is
tremendous. This is the most severe food crisis in the world today.”31 Urging an intensive global
response, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser called on States to take immediate, decisive action to
address the impact of climate change.32
In the context of sustainable development, it may be important to mention that Qatar is a
member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which is a
permanent intergovernmental organization of 12 oil-exporting developing nations. Oil producing
nations are high carbon emitters, and are under international pressure to reduce their emissions.
Although Qatar did not attend all of the climate change negotiations, OPEC was represented at
the Earth Summit in Rio, Brazil as well as negotiations in Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, Doha
and Warsaw. OPEC countries have tended to resist demands for emissions reduction.
“Programme of the 2011 High-Level Meeting on Addressing Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.”
United Nations, accessed on October 10, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/desertification2011/plenary.shtml.
32
Ibid.
31
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Qatar is a member of the “Great Green Wall Initiative,” a pan-African proposal to
“green” the continent from west to east in order to battle land desertification. At the national
level, food security is also a major issue. A master plan was developed in 2008 by His Highness
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa A1 Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar at the time, to ensure that
Qatar would develop a state of food security by 2025. Part of this reform was a plan, known as
the Qatar National Food Security Programme (QNFSP), which Qatar implemented to reform the
energy, water, agriculture, and food sectors of Qatar. According to the QNFSP, Qatar recognized
that its farming system needed to be upgraded so a stable water supply could be available. The
Programme also outlined the need for efficient and advanced technologies to minimize the waste
of food and water and to increase productivity.33 Extending its approval externally, Qatar urged
the creation of the “Global Dryland Alliance,” a 2012 initiative which aimed at tackling food
insecurity. The QNFSP noted that countries like Qatar, which faced the challenge of food
insecurity, wanted to take collective actions to improve prevention of and response to food
security crises. This included investing heavily in new food security solutions.34
In the lead up to the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, Qatari nationals and visitors to Doha,
brought together by their common concern for the environment, took to the city to march for
sustainability. The procession, which was organized by Doha Oasis—a grassroot organization
from Qatar which focuses on the environment and health through awareness, actions and
community outreach35— received praise from Fahad Bin Mohammed Al-Attiya, chairman of
the Qatar National Food Security Programme, for demonstrating Qatar’s national commitment to

“National Food Security Program” Hukoomi - Qatar E-Government,, accessed on October18, 2014.
http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/topics/environment%20and%20natural%20resources/national%20food%20sec
urity%20program/
34
“Qatar Calls for Launch of Global Dry Land Alliance in 2012 | PRLog.”PRLog Press Release Distribution,
(March 9, 2012), http://www.prlog.org/11818856-qatar-calls-for-launch-of-global-dry-land-alliance-in-2012.html.
35
“Doha Oasis.” Doha Oasis, accessed on October 10, 2014, http://www.dohaoasis.org/about.php.
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the environment. At a time when Qatar was growing rapidly economically, both the march and
Qatar’s hosting of the Doha Climate Gateway illustrated Qatar’s heightened commitment to
protecting the environment as well as its ability to raise awareness of environmental
sustainability throughout the Middle East.36
Also at this time, representatives from the Qatari government, Qatar Petroleum, and the
World Bank, signed an Administrative Agreement for Qatar’s participation in phase 4 of the
Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partnership, an initiative which covers the period
between 2013 to 2015 and aims to reduce the flaring of gas associated with oil and gas
production in an effort to improve Qatar’s energy efficiency and reduce GHG emissions.37 This
includes implementing a number of gas flaring reduction projects in various oil fields and mega
gas plants in the country. While the oil and gas production in Qatar has increased fourfold, Qatar
has been able to halve gas flaring. It flared nine cubic meters of gas per barrel of oil equivalent
(boe) produced in 2000, as compared to just 1.1 m3 per boe in 2011.38 Additionally, Qatar’s
permanent constitution, which was ratified in 2004 and came into effect in June 2005,39 had
already made this commitment, stating that “The State shall preserve the environment and its
natural balance in order to achieve comprehensive and sustainable development for all
generations.”40

“Council News-COP 18 in Doha.” (2012), US-QATAR Business Council, accessed on November 8, 2014,
http://www.usqbc.org/news-detail.php?newsid=243.
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“Qatar National Vision 2030.” General Secretariat for Development Planning, (2008), p. 5,
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Qatar’s Role in the Negotiations: Delegate Representation
Qatar’s total number of delegates (266) and high-level delegation (80) is inflated by the
fact that Qatar hosted the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway. As a result, I have given Qatar a dummy
variable for this conference (32), which is equivalent to the average number of Qatar’s
delegates at the other four conferences. For this conference the number of high-level delegates
was also changed to an average of the four conferences. Therefore, Qatar has a new total number
of 160 delegates and 30 high-level delegates at the five climate change negotiations from 20092013.
By looking at the Average Number of Delegates (AND) from Singapore, Norway and
Switzerland at these negotiations, which are similar countries in terms of population and wealth,
I have compared Qatar’s Delegation Count (DC) to the AND to see how Qatar ranks in terms of
its representation at the negotiations (See Table 5.1). Singapore sent 208 delegates, Norway sent
320 delegates, and Switzerland sent 141 delegates. As the Table illustrates, the AND of
Singapore, Norway and Switzerland is 223. According to the benchmark, since Qatar’s DC is
160 delegates, which is less than the AND-10, Qatar ranks below the average representation and
has earned two points as a result.
Table 5.1: Points for Delegate Representation in 2009-2013 Climate Change Negotiations

Benchmark:

DC is 25+ AND=country has above average representation (10 Points)
DC is 10-25 more than AND=(8 points)
DC is AND +/- 10= country has average representation (5 Points)
DC is less than AND-10= country has below average representation (2 Points)
Average Number of
Delegates (AND):
223

Qatar’s Total
Delegate Count
(DC):160

Benchmark:
DC less than AND-10
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Points Earned: 2

In order to determine overall involvement, I have included the two points earned for
Qatar’s delegate representation in Table 6.2 below.
Qatar’s Role in the Negotiations: Determining Involvement
Table 6.2: Determining Involvement
Number of
times for
Attendance at
Negotiations:5
Other
Relevant
Sessions: 1

Number of
Points for
Delegate
Representation
at Negotiations:
2 points

Number of
High-Level
Delegates:
32 (20%)*10 points

Number
of times
Qatar
Spoke: 7

Number of
times Qatar
Presented a
Proposal: 3

Did Qatar
Lead,
Advocate
or Sponsor
for Other
Developing
Countries?
Yes= 4
points

Total
Amount
of Points:
32

*To see the scale of percentage ranges and points, refer to chapter 2.

41-50 points
31-40 points
21-30 points
11-20 points
0-10 points

A+ grade
A grade
B grade
C grade
D grade

As shown in Table 6.2, Qatar attended all five negotiations on climate change and one
special session, the 2011 United Nations High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly to
Address Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought, to get a combined score of six points.
As previously noted, with the dummy variable assigned, Qatar received two points for its
delegate representation as a result of its 160-member delegation and it received 10 points for
sending 32 high-level delegates. As a result, Qatar ranks below the average representation when
compared to similar countries. Qatar’s high-level delegation included: The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh
Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani; Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, the President of the conference
and Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar at the time; and His Excellency Dr. Mohammed bin Saleh
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Al-Sada, Minister of Energy and Industry and Chairman & Managing Director of Qatar
Petroleum.41 Qatar spoke seven times, presented three proposals, and led and advocated on
behalf of other developing countries. In total, Qatar received 32 points, or a low A grade, which
indicates moderately high participation. This grade reflects the fact that as a whole, Qatar—a
hydro-carbon economy—has only recently shown interest in becoming involved in
environmental matters. As climate change poses serious risks for the future, Qatar has recently
begun to take the dangers of climate change more seriously. As already described, the country
has started to implement green technologies to strengthen sustainability efforts and
has prioritized the environment as a chief concern.

I.

Proposals
At the Doha Climate Gateway and the Warsaw talks, Qatar presented three

proposals/statements that stood out:
(1) At Doha, Qatar proposed to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020. The Kyoto
Protocol obliged 35 industrialized nations to cut GHG emissions by an average of at least
5.2 percent below 1992 levels during the period from 2008 to 2012. Within this proposal,
Qatar also offered possible ways to meet developing countries demands for a new
mechanism, including insurance, to help them confront losses and damage caused by the
increase in sea levels and storms linked to climate change.42
(2) At Doha, Qatar, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
submitted plans for economic diversification which served as nationally appropriate
mitigation actions and highlighted Qatar’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions and adopt
renewable energy within the Middle East.43

“Climate Action Sustainable Innovation Forum,” Sustainable Innovation Forum 2012, accessed on October 19,
2014, http://www.cop18qatar.com/.
42
“UPDATE 2-Weak Plan to Save Kyoto Pushes Climate Talks to Brink,” Reuters News Agency, (December 8,
2012).
43
“Summary and Analysis of the Doha Climate Change Conference - November 2012” 26 November - 7 December
2012, Doha, Qatar.” International Institute for Sustainable Development, accessed on October 10, 2014,
http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12567e.html.
41
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(3) At Doha, Qatar called upon developed countries to fulfill their international
obligations in regards to extending assistance to developing countries.44
II.

An Advocate for Other Countries
As previously mentioned, at the 2011 United Nations High-Level Meeting of the

General Assembly to Address Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought in the Context of
Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser advocated for
both the Middle East and East Africa, pointing out that the regions were experiencing its worst
drought in 60 years. He said that in the past three months alone, famine had claimed the lives of
tens of thousands of Somali children under the age of five and forced people from their
communities. He further stressed that major policy interventions in sustainable land-management
strategies would be needed to alleviate these challenges, such as moving towards an ambitious
quantitative target. In addition, he insisted that policies and technologies must be designed to
promote the sustainable use of resources and foreseeable financial support for domestic efforts.45
Furthermore, at the 2011 Durban Conference, Qatar expressed its eagerness to support the
endeavors of developing countries, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS), in adapting
to the inevitable effects of climate change.46
At the 2012 Doha Climate Gateway, Qatar represented the Middle East in its
quest to embark on environmental efforts. It also drew international attention to what the
Middle East could do for climate change mitigation and environmental sustainability within the
region and on a global scale. Although Qatar is one of the world’s highest energy users per
capita, the country wanted the international community to know that it has taken concrete steps
“The Address of His High Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani Amir of the State of Qatar at the 18th
Session of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.” United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (December 4, 2012), p. 2.
45
“2011 High Level Meeting on Addressing Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought in the Context of
Achieving Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication” United Nations, accessed on November 13, 2014,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/desertification2011/plenary.shtml.
46
“Press Release-Decision on the Host of COP18/CMP 8,” United Nations, (November 29, 2011), p. 1.
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to limit its waste and create a sustainable future, and the conference demonstrated the country’s
commitment to fulfilling these goals.47
In terms of supporting developing countries, Qatar, through the GGFR partnership,
agreed to assist other developing countries with gas flaring reduction by improving their gas
infrastructure and gas markets, as a way to expand access to cleaner electricity and cooking
fuels.48 Qatar has also been a member of the Adaptation fund, which provides finance for
adaption projects and programs to developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change.49 Overall, I gave Qatar 4 points for advocating for the Middle
East, Africa, developing countries, and small island developing states.

Reasons for Performance
Vulnerability and Performance
Given the fact that Qatar ranks relatively low on Maplecroft’s CCVI, (See Chapter 4Figure 4.3), why would Qatar take even a moderately active role in the negotiations? Of
course, Qatar has realized that climate change vulnerability is happening. Qatar is beginning to
be involved because they are becoming more vulnerable and its involvement since 2012
indicates that it wants to be more active in the future. In addition, Qatar can see that other
countries are becoming more vulnerable, particularly its regional neighbors, such as the United
Arab Emirates, which has also begun to experience similar challenges to its water resources and
dryland ecosystems as a result of climate change.50
“Council News-COP 18 in Doha.” (2012), US-QATAR Business Council, accessed on November 8, 2014,
http://www.usqbc.org/news-detail.php?newsid=243.
48
Ibid.
49
“About the Adaptation Fund.” The Adaptation Fund, accessed on November 8, 2014, https://www.adaptationfund.org/about.
50
“The United Arab Emirates Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change” Ministry of Energy United Arab Emirates, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, (2006) p. 36, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/arenc1.pdf.
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Other Factors:
Aid and Performance
Although Qatar is beginning to face environmental challenges that need to be properly
resolved, such as achieving water security, reducing carbon emissions, and increasing energy
efficiency,51 Qatar is a very wealthy country and has had the financial means to combat climate
change issues. As previously mentioned, Qatar is classified by the World Bank as a high-income
country.52 Thus, its participation in the recent climate change negotiations was not a result of its
desire for outside financial aid for environmental assistance. As opposed to some low income
countries like Kenya, which regularly advocated for outside financial assistance for
environmental mitigation and adaptation (as discussed in Chapter 4), Qatar has not needed
outside financial aid for environmental assistance. In fact, as a financially stable country,
Qatar has assisted other developing countries by providing finance for climate change mitigation
and adaptation. As previously discussed, this has been evidenced through its GFFR partnership
and its membership in the Adaptation fund. Furthermore, throughout the negotiations, Qatar did
not communicate to parties that funding was a chief concern. Instead, Qatar’s stance centered
more on its domestic objectives, which included evaluating the severity of climate change risks,
reducing its carbon footprint, and putting appropriate policy and governing frameworks in place
to deal with expected changes from climate change. Overall, financial aid for the environment
was not an issue for Qatar and therefore it had no effect on its level of performance.
Prestige and Regional Leadership
In the recent years, Qatar has frequently and successfully applied to host international
General Secretariat for Development Planning, “Advancing Sustainable Development” Qatar National Vision
2030 Second National Human Development Report (2009). p. iii,
]http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Qatar/Qatar_HDR_2009_English.pdf.
52
“Data-Qatar” The World Bank, accessed November 12, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/qatar#cp_cc.
51
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conferences and events. According to Guido Steinberg, Qatar showed interest in hosting the
climate change negotiation not necessarily because of concern about climate issues, but for the
purpose of raising its international profile.53 Qatar has had aspirations to be a regional leader.
Tamim bin Khalifa al-Thani, Emir of Qatar, has promoted Qatar in the region, and one way to
increase Qatar’s prominence is by holding conferences, taking initiatives and attempting to insert
Qatar into as many regional and international power structures as possible.54
With that said, Qatar’s quest to become a regional leader has largely included its
ambitions to become a front-runner in the environmental sphere. For example, as previously
mentioned, Qatar joined in the GGFR partnership with the World Bank in 2009. Notably, it
was the first member of the regional grouping, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to join the
GGFR.55 Kuwait and Iraq later joined the partnership and followed in Qatar’s lead to join the
global efforts to reduce flaring and increase the utilization of associated gas for power
generation and other potential uses.56 Moreover, Qatar’s National Development Strategy 20112016 outlines a plan for Qatar to emerge as a regional or global leader in environmental
technologies and applications. According to this plan, Qatar’s strategy for improved
environmental management involves working towards seven outcomes:
Cleaner water and sustainable use; cleaner air and effective climate change
responses; reduced waste, more recycling and more efficient use; nature and natural
heritage conservation, protection and sustainable management; more sustainable
urbanization and a healthier living environment; an increasingly environmentally aware

Andrea Rönsberg. “Climate Offender Qatar Hosts the World | Environment.” Deutsche Welle. (November 25,
2012).
54
Andrew Hammond “Qatar’s Leadership Transition: Like Father, Like Son,” Policy Brief. London, United
Kingdom: European Council on Foreign Relations. p. 1, accessed on November 11, 2014, http://www.ecfr.eu/page//ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf.
55
“News & Broadcast - Qatar: First Gulf Country Joins World Bank-Led Effort to Reduce Greenhouse Emissions
from Gas Flaring.” The World Bank, (January 25, 2009).
56
“News & Broadcast-Qatar, World Bank Extend Cooperation to Further Reduce Emissions from Gas Flaring” The
World Bank, (March 4, 2014).
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population; improved governance and regional and international cooperation.57 (My
emphasis).

International Pressure to Reduce Emissions
In addition to the factors above, Qatar has had to deal with international pressure.
International concern to combat global warming has grown over the past years. This is evident in
the global Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and international institutions that have
been formed in an effort to combat climate change. In addition, due to the increasing
environmental challenges that countries around the world have faced, there has been an
emergence of a general public awareness regarding global action to address environmental
issues.58 In order to mitigate climate change, countries must reduce carbon emissions. Qatar—
one of the largest emitters in the world—has faced great international pressure in recent years
from both developed and developing countries to reduce carbon emissions and implement safer,
greener technologies. For instance, after the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, developed countries like
the United States urged other industrializing nations like Qatar to reduce GHG emissions.59 In
addition, throughout all of the negotiations, other developing countries have been consistently
pressing for wealthier nations to reduce GHG emissions. Also, after Qatar had been picked
to host the 2012 U.N. Climate Summit, it came under intense public criticism for its high CO2
emissions. As a result, countries were wary about Qatar hosting a climate conference.60
Qatar has also faced pressure from global institutions such as United Nations as well as
environmental NGOs like CAN International, a global network of over seven hundred NGOs.
“Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016” Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning,
(March, 2011) p. 23.
58
Nicholas Robinson and Lal Kurukulasuriya “Training Manual of International Environmental Law” Pace
University School of Law, (2006), p. 1, accessed on December 8, 2014,
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1789&context=lawfaculty.
59
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For example, just days before the 2012 Doha conference, the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) released an emissions gap report, which was conducted by fifty-five scientists
from more than twenty countries. The report showed that greenhouse gas (GHG) levels were
around 14 percent above what they need to be in 2020. UNEP further stressed that “Action to
combat climate chance needs to be urgently scaled up if the world is to have any chance of
keeping the temperature rise below two degrees Celsius.”61 As a result, during the Doha Climate
Gateway, Qatar and President of the Conference, His Excellency Abdullah bin Hamad AlAttiyah, faced criticism and pressure from environmental NGOs to cut down emissions. Wael
Hmaidan, Director of CAN International, stated, “Qatar and the COP president have yet to prove
their leadership on the issue. This week, it is up to the president to prove to the world he takes
climate change seriously. The best way would be to make a pledge for an emission reduction
target for 2020.”62 Overall, Qatar, a country seen as controversial in respect to preserving the
environment, has faced great international pressure to reduce emissions throughout the years. As
a result, international pressure may have prompted it to be proactive in some of the recent
international climate change negotiations.

Spread of Norms
Because Qatar’s vulnerability to climate change has remained low, it is likely that Qatar’s
active role in the negotiations and its desire to host the 2012 Climate Gateway in Doha was
primarily driven by the spread of environmental norms throughout the international community.
As climate change has grown to be a major international issue, governments throughout the
world have united to come together, as demonstrated in the several international climate change
“UN Emission Report Puts Pressure on Doha Conference,” Dot by Dot. (November 21, 2012),
http://www.dotbydot.co.uk/climate-change/245-un-emission-report-puts-pressure-on-doha-conference.
61
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negotiations, to collectively act and form ideas, objectives and solutions to tackle the threats of
climate change. Thus, this new global outlook on climate change and the universal need to pay
more attention to preserving the environment have been translated into environmental beliefs and
norms that have been reinforced through the international community. Overall, the global
consensus, mutual support and action in respect to the environment have been reinforced through
the international negotiations. Thus, it is likely that Qatar’s participation can be explained by a
case of solidarity.
Assessment
Some developing countries were not satisfied with the outcomes of the Doha Climate
Gateway and the later Warsaw Talks. In regards to the former, some developing countries
believed that the aftermath of the Doha Climate Gateway brought no substantial progress on
ambitious international goals, nor did parties move meaningfully toward a new international
agreement which must be negotiated by 2015. In this respect, reactions to the Doha Climate
Gateway were mixed; while some parties were pleased with the results, others were not satisfied
with the fact that countries had not agreed to speed up efforts to do more. Poorer developing
countries simply felt that developed and advanced developing countries had not done enough to
implement concrete climate protection goals. Specifically, they felt that industrialized countries
like Qatar kept delaying these aims. In turn, poorer, developing countries were left deprived of
substantial assistance. At the Doha Climate Gateway, advanced developing and developed
countries did not meet the demands of poorer, developing countries which had requested a clear
time-table for a promised tenfold increase in aid to $100 billion a year by 2020. Instead, the
United States, Europe and other developed nations agreed to put off decisions to 2013.63
63
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Furthermore, while Qatar was expected to steer 194 countries towards a new goal to reduce
GHGs at the Doha Climate Gateway, it was difficult to ignore the fact that Qatar itself has been a
gulf nation that has depended largely on oil and gas, and thus has significantly contributed to the
problem.64
On the other hand, Qatar’s contributions to climate change were well received by United
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, who praised Qatar and congratulated the Qatari
government for its successful role in hosting the conference.65 Rachel Kyte, the World Bank’s
Vice President for Sustainable Development also acknowledged Qatar’s efforts, stating, “Qatar’s
support and concrete contributions to minimizing emissions from gas flaring are critical actions
to help limit global warming.”66 She referred to the will of the GGFR partnership to reduce GHG
emissions, noting that Qatar’s efforts had helped to reduce gas flaring by 20 percent, from 172
billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2005 to 140 bcm in 2011, and the cut had prevented some 274
million tons of CO2 emissions.67
Overall, Qatar’s performance in the context of the climate change negotiations has been
somewhat mixed. However, it has had a positive effect on its neighbors. For example, the
United Arab Emirates has begun to adopt similar policies in terms of implementing renewable
energy and they have begun to understand the significant role oil and gas can play as a passage to
a low-carbon, sustainable future. Furthermore, it is evident that momentum has gathered within
the region to embrace renewable energy and invest in clean energy targets.68
“Qatar Hosts Climate Summit Amid Criticism.” Aljazeera English News, (November 25, 2012).
“Council News- Ban Ki-Moon Praises Qatar’s Leadership Efforts at COP-18.” 2012. US-Qatar Business Council,
accessed on November 8, 2014, http://www.usqbc.org/news-detail.php?newsid=243.
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY-TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Climate Change in Trinidad and Tobago
The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is an archipelagic state in the southern Caribbean,
lying northeast of Venezuela, South America and south of Grenada in the Lesser Antilles. It
shares maritime boundaries with Barbados to the northeast and Guyana to the southeast1 (see
Figure 6.1). The country occupies an area of 5,128 square kilometers with a population of 1.3
million people.2 The island of Trinidad is the larger and more populous of the two main
islands; Tobago is much smaller, comprising about six percent of the total area and four percent
of the population.3
Figure 6.1: Map of Trinidad and Tobago

Source- Placesbook.org, 2013.
Trinidad and Tobago experiences two relatively distinct seasonal climatic types: (1)
Tropical Maritime, which occurs from January to May with warm days and cool nights with

“Second National Communication of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change” Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, (2013), p. 6,
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc2.pdf.
2
“Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile” Adaptation Learning Mechanism, accessed on October 24, 2014,
http://www.adaptationlearning.net/trinidad-and-tobago/profile.
3
“Second National Communication” Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, p.6.
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relatively low rainfall, and (2) Modified Moist Equatorial, which occurs from June to December
with hot, humid temperatures and increased rainfall. Tobago, located north of the two islands,
experiences more of a dry season while Trinidad experiences a wetter one.4
According to the United Nations, the Caribbean has experienced some warming over past
decades, as evidenced by increasing average annual maximum and minimum temperatures. The
numbers of days with very hot temperatures are increasing, while the number of days and nights
with very cold temperatures are decreasing. In addition, the average five-day rainfall has
increased while the number of consecutive dry days have decreased.5 As illustrated in Figure 6.2,
Trinidad and Tobago’s average high temperatures have increased greatly over time.6

Figure 6.2: Mean of Daily High Temperature in Trinidad and Tobago.

Source: Berkeley Earth, 2014.

Trinidad and Tobago’s Vulnerability to Climate Change
As Trinidad and Tobago is part of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the
Caribbean sub-region, the threat of climate change is even more severe as compared to other
nations due to the biophysical and socio-economic characteristics of these countries which make
4

Ibid.
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Subregional Headquarters for the
Caribbean. The Economics of Climate Change in the Caribbean. Caribbean Development Report, (2011). p. 9.
6
Berkeley Earth. “Regional Climate Change: Trinidad and Tobago.” Accessed November 3, 2014.
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them especially vulnerable to these impacts. This is a result of the geographic location of many
SIDS countries, which are located in the hurricane belt.7
According to the 2012 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) produced by
Maplecroft, (See Chapter 4-Figure 4.3), Trinidad and Tobago’s vulnerability to climate
change is characterized as “high risk.” However, according to Trinidad and Tobago’s country
profile, given the country’s relatively advanced industrial base and smaller reliance on tourism as
a source of revenue, it could be said it is better placed to adapt to climate change than many of its
Caribbean neighbors.8 Nonetheless, as identified by the government, Trinidad and Tobago’s
coastal and marine resources, freshwater resources, forestry, land use and biodiversity are the
most vulnerable areas to the impacts of climate change. Human health and human settlements are
other vulnerable sectors as well. In addition, sensitive ecosystems, the agricultural and economic
sectors, and sea-levels will continue to be negatively impacted by climate change. 9 These issues
will be discussed in further detail in the following section.

I.

Economy
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Trinidad and Tobago is the largest

producer of oil and gas in the Caribbean and its economy is dependent on its energy supplies.
The oil and gas sector contributes 46 percent of the nation’s $27.14 billion GDP (2013 est.) and
the poverty rate is below 17 percent. 10 The per capita income of the country is approximately
US$18,864 per year.11 As the Inter-American Development Bank notes, Trinidad and

7

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Subregional Headquarters for the
Caribbean. “The Economics of Climate Change in the Caribbean-Summary Report” (2011). p. 1.
8
“Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile” Adaptation learning Mechanism.
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Ibid.
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“The World Factbook, Central America and Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago.” Central Intelligence Agency,
accessed on September 8, 2014, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html.
11
“Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile,” Adaptation Learning Mechanism.

85

Tobago is largely reliant on producing oil and gas to fuel its economy, and as a result, it is a high
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions emitter. Thus, the country is presented with growing
challenges of developing sustainability while ensuring economic growth. In response to these
challenges, Trinidad and Tobago’s government has recognized the potential to take part in
substantial greenhouse gas emissions reductions as part of its response to climate change and has
identified the financial requirements to effectively address climate change issues and the
importance of developing the policy framework to shift to a low carbon development path.12

II.

Sea-level
Significant sea-level rise is projected to occur in Trinidad and Tobago, which will cause

increased flooding, soil erosion, and loss of coastline and coastal amenities such as human
settlements, wetlands, related ecosystem goods and services and coastal agricultural lands due to
soil salinization.13 Furthermore, sea-level rise threatens a significant amount of the country’s
biodiversity, as wetlands form the habitations of a diverse set of highly vulnerable species of
plants and animals. As over ninety percent of the wetlands are less than five meters in elevation,
these areas are very vulnerable to the effects of sea level rise.14

III.

Agriculture
Trinidad and Tobago’s agricultural sector is very vulnerable to changes in

precipitation which stem from climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) mentions three consequences for Trinidad and Tobago’s agricultural sector: (1) Global
warming will likely cause decreased crop yields and increased aridity of soils and decreased crop
“Trinidad and Tobago Will Integrate Climate Change to Its Development Agenda with IDB Loan,” InterAmerican Development Bank, (2011).
13
“National Climate Change Policy” Environmental Management Authority, (July 2011) p. 9.
14
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yields; (2) less irrigation water availability; and (3) the projected increase in sea level will likely
destroy coastal areas and soils which will lead to decreased crop yields and limit the availability
of land for agricultural production. In turn, these effects will cause a reduction in agricultural
productivity and competitiveness, which will reduce economic opportunities for agricultural
profit and investment.15
IV.

Water
Climate change has led to significant impacts on Trinidad and Tobago’s water supply.

The government has noted that “While around 92 percent of the population has access to
drinking water, water supply is only regularly available to around 26 percent.” 16 The remainder
of those supplied only receive water on a limited weekly schedule.17 Furthermore, water-related
diseases that have arisen as a result of climate change have had a damaging impact on the
population. The government stated that, “Despite a high life expectancy (approaching 70 years)
and a low infant mortality rate (2.4 per 1,000 births) [in Trinidad and Tobago], water-related
diseases are still widespread and figure among the leading causes of mortality, which is
indicative of low water and sanitation service levels.”18 Furthermore, the government describes
the projected effects from climate change on the water sector:
The projected decrease in precipitation and increase in temperature coupled with increasing
demand for water are likely to place significant stresses on the water sector, making
it especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Specifically, likely increases in
evaporation and evapo-transpiration as well as reduced precipitation will affect groundwater
recharge rates. Coastal aquifers and reservoirs located in coastal areas will be susceptible to
salt-water intrusion and inundation.19

“National Climate Change Policy,” p. 8.
“National Circumstances of Trinidad and Tobago-Second National Communication of the Republic of Trinidad
and Tobago Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.” Government of the Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago, p. 69, accessed on November 23, 2014. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc2.pdf.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. pp. 69-70.
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Ibid. p. 66.
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V.

Health
Climate change has had a significant impact on health and will continue to do so in the

future. The effects are summarized in Table 6.3 below:
Table 6.3: Climate Change Effects on Health in Trinidad and Tobago
Short Term






Long Term


Increased death/Injuries from heat waves.
Direct injury or death from flooding,
landslides and hurricanes.
Increase in hunger and malnutrition from crop
failure and increased food prices.
Increase in respiratory illnesses and mortality
due to increased dust and ground-level ozone.
Increase in water-borne and vector-borne
diseases, such as dengue fever (high risk).





Psychological Effects (anxiety, depression and
stress.)
Increase in coronary diseases from decreased
quality of life and resulting increased stress.
Trauma from permanent loss of homes from
inundation through sea-level rise or increased
seasonal flooding and landslides.
Physical conditions resulting from disease,
water-scarcity and loss of food and shelter.

Source- K. Kumarsingh and D.D. Chadee (2008).

VI.

Sensitive Ecosystems
As climate change will cause the increase in sea surface temperature, there will be a

significant loss of natural coastal defenses and ecosystems such as coral reefs and fisheries.
Moreover, the Caroni Basin area, located between the northern mountain range and the central
range of Trinidad and Tobago, is considered to be highly vulnerable to climate change for the
following three reasons: first, it is the most densely populated area of the country and has a
significant concentration of biodiversity; second, the area is already under threat from poor landuse practices, including deforestation of the northern range that has caused flooding in the lower
areas of the Basin, as well as siltation and a decline in water resources; third, increased carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere dissolves in the ocean and results in a lower seawater pH which can be
detrimental to the abundant fisheries that are in the country.20
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“Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile,” Adaptation Learning Mechanism.
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Trinidad and Tobago’s Approach to Climate Change
According to its representatives, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, as a signatory to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto
Protocol, has been committed to mitigating climate change.21 It is a part of the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS), which was formed in 1990 to represent the interests of SIDS in the
international climate change negotiations.22 Furthermore, the country has recognized that as a
SIDS, it is evident that it will be severely impacted by the adverse effects of climate change as a
result of its inherent characteristics such as small land space, limited technical and technological
capacity and limited financial capacity.23
Trinidad and Tobago first attended the UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992.
At the Conference, the special case of small islands and coastal areas was highlighted in Agenda
21, which is a plan of action for sustainable development that was adopted by the international
community. As an essential outcome of the conference, Agenda 21 called for a future
global conference on the sustainable development of SIDS.24
Two years later, in 1994, the UN Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of
SIDS was held in Barbados. The Conference, which Trinidad and Tobago attended, adopted the
Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS (BPOA), a 14-point
program that identifies priority areas and specific actions necessary for addressing the special
Second National Communication. (2013), p. 1. and Dr. Roodal Moonilal, “Trinidad and Tobago Climate Change
Policy – Summary Statement,” Earth Conscious Magazine, (September 7, 2011).
22
Carola Betzold. (2010). “‘Borrowing’ Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate
Change Regime, 1990-1997.” Political Studies Association, Politics, 30 (3): 131–48. p. 131.
23
“The Honourable Roodal Moonilal at the High-Level Meeting on the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy
for Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States” 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (2010), Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to
the United Nations, p. 1, http://www.sidsnet.org/msi_5/docs/hlr/statements/rt1/Trinidad_and_Tobago.pdf.
24
“UN Conference on Environment and Development,” (June 1992), SIDS Net http://www.sidsnet.org/aboutsids/unced.
21
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challenges faced by SIDS.25 The BPOA specifically highlights how the small size of small-island
developing states means that development and environment are closely interrelated and
interdependent.26 It also emphasized the special challenges and constraints that cause significant
hindrance to the socio-economic development of SIDS, including small size and geographic
isolation that prevent economies of scale.27 The Conference reaffirmed the principles and
commitments to sustainable development embodied in Agenda 21 and translated these into
specific policies, actions and measures to be taken at the national, regional and international
levels.28
Trinidad and Tobago had recognized early on that when the UN discussed the
environment, the vulnerability of SIDS was not included. It wasn’t until the 1994 Barbados
Program of Action that the special needs of SIDS were really globally recognized. Trinidad and
Tobago, a more powerful small island developing as compared to its Caribbean neighbors,
emerged as a country that was eager to take on efforts to promote the idea that SIDS should be
treated differently. In particular, as the BPOA highlighted the fact that SIDS face issues of
economic vulnerability and poverty, Trinidad and Tobago played a large role thereafter—-as
demonstrated in its involvement in the recent climate change negotiations— in promoting the
idea that climate change poses unique challenges to the socio-economic development of SIDS,
and as a result, the international community would have to pay special attention to SIDS in the
environmental agenda so that they can achieve sustainable development.
The government of Trinidad and Tobago has also begun to develop domestic initiatives

“Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA) | SIDSnet: Small Island Developing States Network.” (2014) SIDSnet,
accessed November 9, 2014, http://www.sidsnet.org/about-sids/bpoa.
26
“Report of The Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States-Barbados
Programme of Action,” United Nations General Assembly, (1994), p. 7.
27
“Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA) | SIDSnet: Small Island Developing States Network.”
28
Ibid.
25
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pertaining to climate change, such as outlined in the First National Communication to the
UNFCCC in 2001 and a Second National Communication in 2008. While the First National
Communication focuses on national circumstances, details the national inventory of GHGs, and
provides statements on vulnerability and adaptation strategies, technology needs, and capacity
building and research,29 the Second National Communication builds upon the first and
additionally includes mitigation options, a collection and analysis of national inventory of
GHGs, and recommendations for proper data collection and sharing, technology needs, and
capacity building.30
According to the Second Communication, since the initial National Communication was
created, significant national policy developments have been carried out by the government of
Trinidad and Tobago, including the 2006 National Environmental Policy (NEP), (A first NEP
was laid in Parliament in 1998), the 2011 National Forest Policy and the 2011 National Climate
Change Policy. While the National Forest Policy works to guide the sustainable management of
Trinidad and Tobago’s natural forestry and wildlife resources in an effort to mitigate climate
change and build climate resilience, the National Environment Policy and the Climate Change
Policy serve as administrative and legislative frameworks for environmental management policy
guidance in order to pursue a low-carbon development path.31 A major objective under this
agenda has been to shift the economy away from its dependence on non- renewable resources
and move towards implementing alternative, renewable energy sources. Trinidad and Tobago’s
Manifesto 2010, its Medium Term Policy Framework (MTPF 2011-2014), and its 2012

“Initial National Communication of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,” Environmental Management Authority, (2001), [Foreword] p. 3, accessed October
5, 2014, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc1.pdf.
30
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, “Second National Communication,” p. 1.
31
Ibid. pp. 2-3.
29
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Sustainability Report demonstrate this aim.32 Additional evidence of this is illustrated through
the development of a Solar Industrial Development Plan and the National Wind Resource
Assessment Programme, which serve to promote the expansion and use of renewable energy
resources and energy efficiency.33
Trinidad and Tobago’s Role in the Negotiations: Delegate Representation
Trinidad and Tobago had a total number of 31 delegates and 11 high-level delegates at
the five climate change negotiations from 2009-2013, (not including other relevant sessions). By
looking at the Average Number of Delegates (AND) from Uruguay, Jamaica and the Maldives at
these negotiations, which are similar countries in terms of population and wealth, I have
compared Trinidad and Tobago’s Delegation Count (DC) to the AND to see how Trinidad and
Tobago ranks in terms of its representation at the negotiations (See Table 6.1). Uruguay sent 51
delegates, Jamaica sent 32 delegates and the Maldives sent 77 delegates. As the Table illustrates,
the AND of Uruguay, Jamaica, and the Maldives is 53. According to the benchmark, since
Trinidad and Tobago’s DC is 31 delegates, which is more than ten points below average,
Trinidad and Tobago ranks as having a below average representation and has earned two points
as a result.

“Working for Sustainable Development in Trinidad and Tobago,” Ministry of Planning and the Economy, (June,
2012), pp. 1, 16.
33
“Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs | Wind Resource Assessment Programme (WRAP), Ministry of Energy
and Energy Affairs, accessed on November 25, 2014, http://www.energy.gov.tt/our-business/alternativeenergy/wind-resource-assessment-programme-wrap/, and “Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs | Pilot Projects,”
Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs, accessed on November 25, 2014, http://www.energy.gov.tt/ourbusiness/alternative-energy/pilot-projects/.
32
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Table 6.1: Points for Delegate Representation in 2009-2013 Climate Change Negotiations

Benchmark:
DC is 25+ AND=country has above average representation (10 Points)
DC is 10-25 more than AND=(8 points)
DC is AND +/- 10= country has average representation (5 Points)
DC is less than AND-10= country has below average representation (2 Points)
Average Number of
Delegates (AND): 53

Total Delegate Count
(DC): 31

Benchmark:
DC is less than AND-10

Points Earned: 2

In order to determine overall involvement, I have added the two points earned for
Trinidad and Tobago’s delegate representation in Table 6.2 below.

Trinidad and Tobago’s Role in the Negotiations: Determining Involvement
Table 6.2: Determining Involvement
Number of
times for
Attendance at
Negotiations: 5

Number of Points
for Delegate
Representation at

Negotiations:
2 points

Number of
high-level
delegates:
11 (35.5%)*15 points

Attendance at
Other Special
Sessions: 3

Number
of times
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Spoke: 6

Number of
times
Trinidad
and Tobago
Presented a
Proposal: 7

Did Trinidad
and Tobago
Lead,
Advocate or
Sponsor for
Other
Developing
Countries?
Yes= 3 points

Total
Amount of
Points: 41

*Trinidad and Tobago’s high-level delegation percentage is just above the range for countries scoring twenty
points. Its score has been modified to reflect this. To see the scale of percentage ranges and points, refer to
chapter 2.

41-50 points
31-40 points
21-30 points
11-20 points
0-10 points
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A+ grade
A grade
B grade
C grade
D grade

According to Table 6.2, Trinidad and Tobago received a total of 41 points, or a low A
plus level grade which illustrates exceptional participation in the climate change negotiations. In
regards to the number of negotiations Trinidad and Tobago attended, it attended all five
negotiations. In addition, it attended three special sessions: the 2013 opening of the second
session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action; the 2013
51st Commission for Social Development Session; and the 2013 bilateral climate change talks
with the European Union. Taken together, Trinidad and Tobago’s score for attendance is 8.
As previously noted, Trinidad and Tobago received 2 points for its delegate representation
as a result of its 31-member delegation, which ranks below the average level of representation
when compared to other similar countries. Trinidad and Tobago also received 15 points for
sending 11 high-level delegates. The delegation spoke six times, presented a proposal/statement
seven times, and advocated for other countries to receive 3 extra points. Thus, in reference to the
analysis, Trinidad and Tobago has been highly proactive and committed throughout all of the
negotiations.
Trinidad and Tobago used the negotiations as an opportunity to speak on behalf of small
island developing states, emphasize its high vulnerability to climate change, and communicate to
parties its ideas, needs and requests in respect to combating climate change. Some of Trinidad
and Tobago’s notable high-level delegates included the following four key officials: (1) Dr.
Roodal Moonilal, Minister of Housing and the Environment and chair of the Commonwealth,
who attended the 2010 Cancun Conference; (2) Ramona Ramdial, Minister of State in the
Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, who attended the 2012 Doha Climate
Gateway; (3) Charles Eden, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Trinidad and
Tobago to the United Nations, who attended the 2013 51st Commission for Social Development,
and (4) Kishan Kumarsingh, Head of Multilateral Environmental Agreements at the Ministry of
the Environment, who attended all five negotiations.
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I.

Proposals
Trinidad and Tobago, together with the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS),

of which Trinidad and Tobago is a member, presented seven statements/proposals that stood out:
(1) At Copenhagen, Trinidad and Tobago proposed to limit temperature increases to
below 1.5 degrees Celsius.34
(2) At Cancun, Trinidad and Tobago urged the rejection of the use of per capita
emissions or any other metric as any basis for defining the obligations of countries to
reduce their emissions, as they felt this method was unfair to small, energy-producing
countries like Trinidad and Tobago. Instead, they felt absolute emissions provided a
more just method and called for an agreement on meaningful mitigation actions by all
countries and the historical responsibility of developed countries. 35
(3) Also at Cancun, Trinidad and Tobago called for immediate action on adaptation,
REDD, technology transfer, and the provision of financial resources.36
(4) Furthermore, at Cancun, Trinidad and Tobago requested positive consideration of
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology, a technological solution which
captures Co2 before it enters the atmosphere and stores it in suitable sinks for an
extended period of time in order to mitigate emissions.37
(5) At Durban, Trinidad and Tobago called for the increase in the global share of
renewables in energy supply, noting that increasing from roughly 10% at present to
15% by 2020 has the potential to significantly reduce the ‘ambition gap’.38
(6) At Doha, Trinidad and Tobago requested clarity that the appropriate scope and scale
of financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building will be available for
developing country Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).39 40
(7) Also at Doha, Trinidad and Tobago called for significant emission reduction targets
for developed countries, including more ambitious (NAMAs) by developing
countries, with the goal to define an ambitious yet practically feasible and achievable
GHG reduction objective in the near future.41

“Press Conference by Alliance of Small Island States on Climate Change” United Nations, (2009).
Statement made by the Honourable Doctor Roodal Moonilal, p. 3.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
“Submission from the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. (December 2, 2011), p. 4.
39
“Closing the Ambition Gap: A Workplan For Survival-Bonn Climate Change Conference.” Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS), (2012), p. 9.
40
According to the UNFCCC, “NAMAs refer to any action that reduces emissions in developing countries and is
prepared under the umbrella of a national governmental initiative. They can be policies directed at transformational
change within an economic sector, or actions across sectors for a broader national focus. NAMAs are supported and
enabled by technology, financing, and capacity-building and are aimed at achieving a reduction in emissions relative
to 'business as usual' emissions in 2020.”
41
“Closing the Ambition Gap: A Workplan For Survival” p. 9.
34
35
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II.

An Advocate for Other Countries

As presented in the following table (See Table 6.2), Trinidad and Tobago’s high-level
delegation participated at the negotiations to not only advocate for itself but also for other
developing countries that were vulnerable to climate change.

Table 6.2:
2010 Cancun Negotiation

2013 Bilateral Talks With the European Union

The 2013 Warsaw Talks

The 51st Commission for Social Development,
2013

On behalf of AOSIS, Trinidad and Tobago urged for
immediate action on adaptation, reducing emissions from
deforestation in developing countries, loss and damage,
technology transfer, and the provision of financial
resources.42
On behalf of other developing countries, Trinidad and
Tobago urged parties to use the upcoming Warsaw talks
as an opportunity to reach a legally binding agreement that
would be applicable to all, so that developing countries
would not continue to suffer the worst from climate
change. 43
T&T’s Kishan Kumarsingh, Head of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements at Ministry of the
Environment, represented all developing countries by
being appointed to co-chair at the Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. 44
Eden Charles, the representative of T&T, spoke on behalf
of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to reiterate its
position that climate change was one of the principal
challenges impeding efforts by SIDS to achieve their
social development objectives. He pointed out that small
islands could have their entire economies destroyed by a
single weather event, which would worsen poverty,
increase unemployment and destroy infrastructure. He
also said that CARICOM Governments and institutions
were continuing to develop strategies to help the region's
people overcome social development challenges,
highlighting that those efforts were obstructed by the
failure of some development partners to live up to
internationally agreed goals and objectives.45

42

Statement by the Honourable Doctor Roodal Moonilal, (2010), p.3.
“Trinidad and Tobago and the European Union Hold High-level Talks on Climate Change” Caribbean Energy
Information System, (2013).
44
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, “CARICOM Leaders bid Farewell to Madiba”
Inside Foreign Affairs, (2013), p. 3.
45
Donn Bobb. “Climate Change One of the Main Challenges Impeding SIDS Efforts to Achieve Social
Development Efforts: CARICOM | United Nations Radio.” (2013).
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Thus, it is evident that throughout the recent climate change negotiations Trinidad and Tobago
spoke for SIDS (AOSIS) as well as for CARICOM and developing countries as a whole (three
points earned).
Reasons for Trinidad and Tobago’s Good Performance

Vulnerability and Performance
As identified by Maplecroft’s CCVI, (See Chapter 4-Table 4.3), Trinidad and Tobago is
highly vulnerable to climate change, and so it is likely that its high participation in the climate
change negotiations could be attributed to its high vulnerability rate. This is shown through the
fact that throughout the negotiations, Trinidad and Tobago emphasized its high vulnerability and
stressed the need for the international community to put forward greater action in order to reduce
harmful environmental effects. For instance, in 2013, at the opening of the second session of the
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), AOSIS delivered
a statement citing the countries’ high vulnerability to climate change, and expressed concern
over future climate change effects, such as stronger and more deadly tropical cyclones,
prolonged droughts, biodiversity loss, and acceleration in sea level rise. Furthermore, as
previously noted, Trinidad and Tobago, together with AOSIS, stressed that parties must achieve
an ADP agreement that ultimately decreases CO2 concentrations to safe levels in order to limit
warming to below 1.5 degrees by the end of the century.46

“For Immediate Release: AOSIS Opening Statement ADP 2 | Alliance of Small Island States – AOSIS,” Alliance
of Small Island States (April 29, 2013).
46
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Other Factors:
Aid and Performance
Trinidad and Tobago has also been focused on gaining technical and financial support for
climate change mitigation. While they said that they are fully committed to reducing GHGs and
have implemented domestic adaptation programs and projects, they have stressed the need for
technological and financial support from developed country partners in order to enhance their
ability to address climate change issues. In fact, the country has secured funding, including loans
from the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (See Table 6.3) for adaptation
programs and projects to be implemented in Trinidad and Tobago’s various sectors. While some
loans have been secured for implementing sustainable development into Trinidad and Tobago’s
ecosystem restoration, other loans have been secured for improving the energy sector and
mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into a sustainable development agenda in Trinidad
and Tobago and other Caribbean countries.

Table 6.3: Environmental Assistance to Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean Region.
(2003-Present)
Funder/Partner
The World Bank/
Global Environment
Facility (GEF)

Program
Nariva Ecosystem
Restoration and Carbon
Sequestration: Trinidad
& Tobago (2009-2018)

GEF

Energy for Sustainable
Development in the
Caribbean. (2010Ongoing.)

GEF

Mainstreaming
Adaptation
to Climate Change:
Caribbean Community
(MACC). (2003-2009).

Description
Restore and conserve the Nariva
wetlands, through the recognition
of the services it provides as a
carbon sink and a biodiverse
ecosystem.
Transfer and implement energy
efficiency policies and
instruments to the Caribbean
countries to enable cost effective
greenhouse gas emission
reductions of 20 to 50 percent in
the coming decades.
Build regional capacity to collect
and analyze data; build in-country
capacity to formulate and analyze
adaptation policy options and
finalize sectoral adaptation
strategies for participating
countries; build capacity in
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Amount
$4.60
million

$11.3
million

$10.95
million

preparation for a regional position
for the UNFCCC; support public
education and outreach programs
by strengthening information
access and data resources; and
foster public awareness through
technical assistance and capacity
building.
Sources: Global Environment Facility (2012); the World Bank (2014); and Adaptation Learning Mechanism (2009).

Prestige and Performance
Trinidad and Tobago played a significant role in the founding of AOSIS, as it wanted to
create a unified group which would play a key role in the negotiations.47 Additionally, as climate
change will be a long term problem, Trinidad and Tobago got involved in the negotiations
because the government saw it as an opportunity to get on board early and bring small island
states together.
As Trinidad and Tobago is a wealthier small-island developing state, it has held a more
powerful position as compared to its Caribbean neighbors. In this respect, Trinidad and Tobago
could participate more in the climate change negotiations and serve as a spokesperson for the
region. According to Ghallagher, it used the negotiations as an opportunity to demonstrate
innovation, resilience and leadership on the issue.48 Also, since it had the financial means to
adopt newer environmental technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, it assumed that
other developing countries within the Caribbean and elsewhere could follow suit. 49 Ultimately,
Trinidad and Tobago did not want to compromise the interests of vulnerable small island
“CARICOM Statement by H.E. Mr. Dennis Francis,” United Nations, (March 31, 2014), p. 2,
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/8157caricom.pdf.
48
Rajendra Ramlogan and Natalie Persadie, “The Inherent Conflict Between Sound Environmental Stewardship and
Political Leadership in the Developing World: A Case Study of Trinidad and Tobago.” In Deborah Rigling
Gallagher (Ed.), Environmental leadership: A reference handbook, Sage Publications, Inc., (2012): 558.
49
Donnie Boodlal, Haydn I. Furlonge, Rachael Williams. “Trinidad and Tobago’s CO2 Inventory and Techno‐
economic Evaluation of Carbon Capture Options for Emission Mitigation.” The University of Trinidad and Tobago,
(2008), p. 2.
47
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developing states, and given the fact that the negotiations were resulting in limited progress and
stalemates, Trinidad and Tobago specifically attended the negotiations out of self-interest. The
country used the talks as an opportunity to focus on the needs of itself and other small-island
developing states.
Assessment
Trinidad and Tobago’s high participation in the recent international climate
change negotiations is likely due to the recognition of its high vulnerability to climate change, as
my hypothesis proposes. The country says it has recognized the need to take action in fighting
climate change and has developed domestic policies to counter environmental threats. However,
despite its high level of participation, the country does have high emissions and has “excused”
itself by asking for the non-use of per capita measures. Trinidad and Tobago’s high attendance
can also be attributed to the need for outside assistance for climate change mitigation and
adaptation.
In addition, although small island developing states like Trinidad and Tobago are very
vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as they face threats such as significant sea-level rise,
loss of agricultural lands and biodiversity loss, the concerns of these countries were buried in the
environmental agenda. As previously mentioned, it wasn’t until the 1994 Barbados Programme
of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States that the needs of
these countries were globally recognized. A direct connection between environmentalism and
sustainable development came out of this program, as nations agreed that in order to counter
poverty and economic vulnerability in small island developing states, sustainable development
was necessary. Furthermore, Trinidad and Tobago recognized early on that when the United
Nations initially discussed the environment, the vulnerability of SIDS was not acknowledged. As
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a result, Trinidad and Tobago took it upon themselves to promote the needs of SIDS at the
negotiations and emphasized that these countries would have to be treated differently. To this
end, Trinidad and Tobago has played a significant role in unifying small island states and serving
as an environmental leader in its region.
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CHAPTER 7-CONCLUSION
In this study, I have explored the link between vulnerability and participation in
international negotiations on climate change. I have chosen this topic due to the important and
urgent nature of the climate change problem. Climate change has caused significant destruction
to societies across the world and earth’s biodiversity. Furthermore, it continues to be a growing
problem and no global plan to successfully combat climate change has been formulated by the
international community. Moving forward, as the world continues to be plagued by climate
change, it is imperative to take into account the necessary conditions for countries to be more
open to negotiating, as only then will the global community be one step closer to achieving a
successful united plan. Finally, it is vital to establish a global plan so the international
community does not continue to face a variety of challenges which stem from climate change as
well as to secure the health of the planet for future generations.
In this thesis, I hypothesized that only when developing countries are able to observe the
physical destruction of their environment and face challenges to adapt to new climatic conditions
are they likely to become proactive in negotiations. I chose three developing countries for case
study analysis: Kenya, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago. Kenya is large but economically
disadvantaged, and extremely vulnerable as it faces major adverse impacts from climate change.
It has been very active in environmental issues with respect to climate change negotiations and it
has played an important role among African states. Qatar, a very wealthy but tiny nation, is
ranked much lower in vulnerability although it is beginning to feel negative environmental
impacts. As a hydro-carbon economy, it has been under pressure to reduce its carbon emissions.
Until recently, it has not been very active in climate change negotiations but in 2012 it hosted the
Doha Climate Gateway. Trinidad and Tobago is also small in size, an island, a hydro-carbon
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economy, and highly vulnerable as it faces adverse impacts of climate change.
The cases conform to the hypothesis: Kenya and Trinidad and Tobago both ranked
as highly vulnerable on Maplecroft’s climate change vulnerability index and have been active in
negotiations. Qatar has begun to see the effects of the changing climate and has started to get
involved. However, the perception of vulnerability by itself does not mean that a country will be
proactive. I found that countries might have been enticed by the prospect of financial aid as well.
Although this was difficult to prove, Kenya’s constant plea for aid suggested that this was very
crucial. Trinidad and Tobago also wanted aid to deal with the problem of small island developing
states. More important to Qatar, however, was the international pressure it has faced to reduce
emissions. Qatar has also been influenced to participate by the spread of environmental norms
and the desire for inclusion. All three countries selected also seemed to be interested in
prestige. This is particularly so for Kenya and Qatar. Both are playing important regional roles.
This was less in the case for Trinidad and Tobago, although it did seem to want to lead small
island developing states to some degree.
Taken altogether, my findings reveal that along with feeling the impacts of climate
change, other factors, such as financial aid for environmental assistance and sustainable
development, self-interest, the spread of environmental norms, international pressure, and the
desire for prestige and political leadership are all significant influences that are likely to play a
part in motivating developing countries to be more proactive in climate change negotiations.
Given the severity of climate change and the projection that it is likely to worsen, threats
stemming from climate change will likely spread and become more prioritized by the
international community. Thus, future studies should examine the motivations of a wide variety
of states in becoming more involved in climate change negotiations.
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